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A "collective bargain" is itself a "contract"; but it is a contract of
a very special kind ....
Corbin on Contracts § 1420
Professor Corbin relegated collective agreements to the periphery of
contract law. His treatise briefly sketched the rights and duties created
by collective agreements in a single section, placed without explanation
in the chapter on "fllegal Contracts," and throughout the work the ap-
plication of contract rules and principles to collective agreements was
either casually mentioned or wholly ignored.' Professor Corbin's justi-
fication for this neglect was that collective agreements were only mar-
ginally relevant to the central concerns of his treatise:
A collective bargain differs very greatly from the ordinary bargain
of commerce, the parties to which are comparatively few, and the
subject matter and purposes of which are generally very limited.
The collective bargain has many features of a fundamental orga-
nizing statute, whose broad provisions control, in some degree,
the activities of many individuals who may have had little or no
part in its drafting and who may even have been bitterly opposed
to the draftsmen. The collective bargainers cannot foresee all of
the problems that are sure to arise and cannot provide for the in-
numerable details of the future administration of the bargain....
This treatise does not attempt the analysis and discussion of col-
lective bargains. They cannot be treated with advantage separately
from the general subject of Labor Relations and Labor Legisla-
tion.2
Professor Corbin was not alone in his view of collective agreements
as only distantly related to contracts proper. Dean Shulman, in his fa-
mous Holmes Lecture, "Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Rela-
tions,"3 acknowledged that collective agreements are made with the
t Garver Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.S. 1939, J.D. 1942, illinois; LL.M. 1946.
Columbia.
1. A few brief sentences categorize collective agreements as third party beneficiary
contracts, with the employee as donee beneficiary. See 4A A. CotnnN, Co.'inAcTS § 781,
at 72, § 782, at 83-84 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Conmmi]. The rights of the union and
the individual employee are briefly stated in footnotes. Id. § 812 n.19, § 814 n.55. A few
other sentences reject categorizing collective agreements as "joint" or "joint and several"
contracts and cast them into outer darkness with these words:
Great bargaining transactions such as these, of great variety among themselves, have
not yet received clear analysis. . . . This remains for the future, to be determined
by legislation, perhaps by conflict.
Id. § 923, at 697.
2. 6A CoaBIN § 1420, at 343 (1962).
3. 68 HRiv. L. Rv. 999 (1955).
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expectation that both sides will respect them as binding commitments
and that "[i]n the business world such commitments are called con-
tracts .... [T]he collective labor agreement itself comes to be called
the contract even by the workers . . . ."4 Nevertheless Dean Shulman re-
jected the proposition that the law should treat collective agreements
as contracts and vigorously argued that legal enforcement was incom-
patible with the system of self-government contemplated by the col-
lective agreement. 5 Other writers in labor law have emphasized the
difference between collective agreements and ordinary contracts, and
labor arbitrators have studiously shunned looking either to treatises or
to the Restatement of Contracts for guidance or even quotable author-
ity. Although Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act has
made collective agreements legally enforceable in the federal courts,
the Supreme Court has reechoed the litany that "a collective agree-
ment is not an ordinary contract" and that the substantive law should
be fashioned "from the policy of our national labor laws," not simply
drawn from traditional contract law.
The customary distinction between collective agreements and "or-
dinary contracts" assumes that there is a relevant legal category of "or-
dinary contracts"-as distinguished from, I suppose, "special contracts."
It further assumes that the law of contracts is, and should be, centrally
concerned with "ordinary contracts." From these two premises is drawn
4. Id. at 1001.
5. It is ironic-and significant-that Professor Corbin and Dean Shulman, who for
years were colleagues on the same faculty and whose philosophies of contracts and eol.
lective agreements followed largely parallel paths, should have reinforced each other
so little. Professor Corbin, in a footnote to his treatise, quoted at length from Professor
Shulman. 6A CORBIN § 1420 n.71 (1962). But there is no hint that either recognized any
basic similarity in their approach to the contracts with which each dealt. They epitomized
the estrangement of contract lawyers and labor lawyers. Professor Corbin treated collec.
tive agreements as irrelevant to the main body of contract law, perhaps because he dis.
liked the collective bargaining process and distrusted arbitration ("Battles have been
fought for the system called 'collective bargaining'; but from the employer's standpoint
a collective bargain has sometimes been found to be an illusion." 1 CoRBI § 2, at 3(1963).); and Dean Shulman treated contract law as irrelevant to collective agreements
because he disliked legal intervention and distrusted the courts. See Shulman, Reason,
Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 999 (1955); H. SHUL AN, Preface
to OPINIoNs OF THE UMPIRE FORD MOTOR Co.-UAW-CIO 1943-1946 (1946). Each within
his own favored forum viewed the contractual process from much the same perspective
and perceived the role of adjudication in much the same terms, but neither drew support
or insight from the other. Indeed, they scarcely recognized their kinship.
6. See, e.g., Cox, The Nature of The Collective Bargaining Agreement, 57 Micu. L.
REv. 1 (1958); St. Antoine, Contract Enforcement and the Courts, 15 LAB. L.J, 83 (1904);
Rice, Collective Agreements in American Law, 44 HARv. L. Rv. 572 (1931); Krules, The
Present Status of Collective Labor Agreements, 51 HARv. L. REV. 520 (1938); Chamberlain,
Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM. L. Rnv. 829 (1948).
7. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
8. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964), restating the analysis of
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-80 (1960).
9. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957),
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the concluding assumption that the legal principles applicable to "or-
dinary contracts" have limited relevance to collective agreements and
that legal principles developed for collective agreements have little
relevance for the rest of the law of contracts. Obviously, a manufac-
turer's bill of sale looks quite unlike his collective agreement, and le-
gal rules for horse trading are quite inadequate for collective bargain-
ing. But it is not obvious that bargains such as bills of sale should be
the central concern of contract law, or that the only contract princi-
ples worth pursuing can be illustrated by hypotheticals about the sale
of "my horse, Bob."10
My purpose here is to submit three broad propositions concerning
the relationship of collective agreements to contract law. The view-
point is inescapably that of a labor lawyer who abandoned teaching
contracts even before Professor Corbin published his treatise. Never-
theless, the propositions have far more significant implications for the
law of contracts generally than for the legal rules governing collective
agreements. They are as follows:
First, a collective bargain dearly "differs greatly from the ordinary
bargain of commerce," but collective agreements are a part of the
mainstream of contracts and cannot be relegated to the periphery of
contract law.
Second, the legal rules governing everyday commercial contracts
can contribute little but mischief when applied to collective agree-
ments, but the basic principles of contract-particularly those so force-
fully articulated by Professor Corbin--can make valuable contribu-
tions to the law of collective agreements.
Third, while we may gain little insight into collective agreements by
looking upon them as contracts, we can achieve significant insights into
the nature of the law of contracts by viewing it from the perspective of
collective agreements.
I. The Collective Agreement as a Contract
No one doubts that a collective agreement is a "contract," no matter
which of many definitions of that term one selects. The question is not
10. The author has himself added his voice to the litany. "The Collective Agreement
differs as much from a common contract as Humpty Duimpty differs from a common
egg." Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration: Alice Through The Looking Glass,
2 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 17 (1952). There is no intention to recant here, for Humpty Dumpty
was an egg, even though he might not have been recognized as such by a chicken. The
point here is that hens are not the only creatures who produce eggs, and indeed that the
common egg is not necessarily the most important or most interesting of all eggs.
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whether collective agreements are contracts, but how much they are
unlike other contracts and whether this makes them somehow less con-
tractual in character. More specifically: in what particular respects are
collective agreements unique, and how does their uniqueness affect
their contractual character?
A. The Uniqueness of Collective Agreements
1. Multiplicity of Parties and Complexity of Provisions
Even the simplest collective agreement creates a three-sided relation-
ship between union, employer, and employees; in many agreements
the union and the employers may themselves be multiple parties as
well. A national agreement between the Auto Workers and General
Motors covers hundreds of thousands of employees in dozens of local
unions, and the Central States Agreement of the Teamsters binds hun-
dreds of employers and their employees. The substantive terms of the
collective agreement may simply define basic terms of wages and hours,
but the agreement more commonly prescribes complex rules regulating
nearly every aspect of the employment relation, even to the size of
work crews, subcontracting, maternity leave, and retirement rights.
Multiple plant or multiple employer agreements, themselves complex,
are normally supplemented by local or individual employer agreements
which modify or further elaborate the provisions of the master agree-
ment.
Such "great bargaining transactions"" are obviously much more
complicated than ordinary contracts for the sale of goods, lease agree-
ments, or employment contracts. They are also far more difficult to
analyze than a life insurance policy to pay a named beneficiary, or a
surety bond to secure performance of a construction contract. Collec-
tive agreements, however, are not unique in having multiple parties
and complex provisions. Indeed, such wide-reaching and multi-faceted
contractual arrangements are commonplace in our intricately organized
society. Consider, for example, the group insurance and pension plans
which exist outside collective bargaining. The TIAA insurance and
pension system for professors is scarcely a simple bilateral structure,
and even more complex are the interlaced rights and duties of doctors,
hospitals, group insurers, and covered individuals under Blue Cross
hospital insurance. Consider also articles of agreement regulating hous-
ing cooperatives, farmers' marketing associations, and stock exchanges;
11. Note 1 supra.
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or negotiated contracts for the sale or merger of corporations involving
the exchange of securities. The complex character of collective agree-
ments does not make them unlike all other contracts, but instead re-
veals their kinship to certain kinds of agreements to which the law of
contracts has always been assumed to apply.
2. Incompleteness of Terms and Lack of Agreement
Because of the diverse congeries of matters covered by a collective
agreement and the practical need for a readable and reasonably con-
cise document, a written agreement cannot possibly provide for the
myriad of variant situations which might arise, even if they could be
foreseen. Because of the pressures to reach a settlement, the parties may
push aside potential problems in the hope that they will never become
real, avoid clarifying language or intent lest it disclose latent disagree-
ment, and deliberately paper over differences with studied ambiguities
which leave each party with the hope, or at least the claim, that it has
gained its point. The end result is a document with broad rules, a mis-
cellany of gaps, unclear language, and unsettled issues. To the parties
it represents agreement, even though they know that it is only the gate-
way to resolution of remaining disagreements.
Such uncertain and incomplete agreements might indeed make some
real estate dealers or bank vice-presidents cringe, but collective agree-
ments are not for that reason strangers to the world of contracts. Con-
struction contracts, for all of their elaborateness, leave many terms
unstated and are often based on the architect's projection of what is
feasible and desirable. As unforeseen problems arise or design changes
become necessary, the contract is adjusted or renegotiated." Long term
suppliers' contracts often leave important terms indefinite or unset-
tled,'3 ship charters may be incomplete, dealer franchises may do little
more than state general rules for conducting the relationship,14 and
articles of partnership may limit themselves to allocating the profit
shares without even stating how profits shall be computed or when
they shall be distributed. Indeed, practically every ongoing business
relationship based on contract has, in a greater or lesser degree, this
quality of incompleteness.
12. Sweet & Sweet, Architectural Cost Predictions: An Institutional Analysis. 56 C ALF.
L. REv. 996 (1968).
18. Note, Requirements Contracts: Problems of Drafting and Construction. 78 FIAn%.
L. REv. 1212 (1965).
14. See S. MAcAuLAY, LAw Amo TmE BALANcE oF PowER; TuE AurfOonstLE MAt'-
FAcmEtms A.'D TH-m DErAmEs (1966).
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Disagreements are often papered over or ignored in commercial
transactions as well as in collective bargains, and for much the same
reasons. In the "battle of forms," purchasing agents order on their
purchase forms and sellers accept on their own acknowledgment-
of-order forms, although the terms and conditions printed on the back
of the two forms are commonly inconsistent.1 Important transactions
are often concluded by brief letters or telephone calls; contingencies,
even foreseeable ones, are not provided for; and details may be omitted
to be filled in as conditions require. 16 The reasons have been suggested
by Professor Macaulay:
If one side insists on a detailed plan, there will be delay while
letters are exchanged as the parties try to agree on what should
happen if a remote and unlikely contingency occurs, In some cases
they may not be able to agree at all on such matters and as a result
a sale may be lost to the seller and the buyer may have to search
elsewhere for an acceptable supplier.1 7
The pressures to close the transaction even though there is not com-
plete agreement may be as great or greater in the commercial than in
the collective bargaining context, at least for one of the parties. In
collective bargaining, although open disagreement postpones settle-
ment, the parties may extend an existing agreement until the issue is
resolved; even a strike only temporarily interrupts the relationship.
In business transactions, however, open disagreement may totally de-
stroy the business relationship, with one of the parties finding more
compliant persons with whom to deal.
3. Compulsory Character of the Bargaining Relationship
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act' articulates the
fundamental principle underlying all of our collective bargaining stat-
utes-that the union designated by a simple majority of the employees
in the bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees in the unit. Selection of a majority union establishes a bar-
gaining relationship which is compulsory for both the employer and
all individual employees,' 9 The employer is compelled to bargain with
15. See Note, Non-conforming Acceptances Under Sec. 2-207 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: An End to the Battle of Forms, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 540 (1963).
16. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations In Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am
Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
17. Id. 64.
18. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
19. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); Weyand, Majority Rule
in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 556 (1945).
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the majority union to the exclusion of all others. He must meet with
the union, consider its proposals, explain his response to those propos-
als, and make good faith efforts to reach an agreement.20 If an agree-
ment is reached, he must be willing to crystallize that agreement in a
written and signed document. 21 The individual employee loses almost
entirely his freedom to contract. He is barred from bargaining on his
own behalf or through any other representative, and he is bound by
the agreement made by the majority union even when he is not a
member, prefers individual bargaining, and opposes the specific terms
negotiated by the union.22
Such coercion admittedly seems foreign to our stereotype of the
contractual relationship as involving mutual assent to agreed terms.
Certainly a collective agreement cannot fit the mold of the common
commercial contract freely bargained on the competitive market. But
this does not deprive collective agreements of their contractual char-
acter nor demonstrate that they are unique, for the compulsion does
not go to the root of the contracting process, nor is compulsion absent
in many other kinds of contracts.
Although the law requires bargaining and channels the bargaining
process, it does not compel agreement nor dictate the terms of settle-
ment.23 The substantive terms are those negotiated and agreed to by
the parties in a bargained exchange..2 4 Nor are the parties irretrievably
tied to each other. If they cannot agree, the employer may, after bar-
20. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (Ist Cir. 1953); Cox, The Duty toBargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401 (1958); Smith, The Evolution of the "Ditty
to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MicH. L. REV. 1065 (1941).
21. H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941). These various elements of compul-
sory bargaining were crystallized into statutory language in Section 8(d) when the Act
was amended in 1947. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
22. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective
Bargaining, 45 COLU. L. REv. 556 (1945).
23. Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39
Micar. L. REv. 1065 (1941); "Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 467 (1964); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith,
71 H.Av. L. REV. 1401 (1958).
24. The m.lange of legal rules surrounding collective bargaining and the use of eco-
nomic force obviously affects the relative bargaining strength of the parties. Prohibiting
secondary boycotts weakens the bargaining positions of some unions significantly; or to
look at the other side of the coin, clauses permitting situs picketing, consumer boycotts.
and "work preservation" strengthen the bargaining position of some unions. The legal
rules on "quickie" or "hiccup" strikes, the right of employees to cross picket lines, and the
right of strikers to reinstatement can be heavy weight on the bargaining scales. Even deter-
minations of the appropriate bargaining unit and rules as to the timing of elections
affect bargaining power. In this sense, the law does affect the substantive terms of the
bargain, just as the anti-trust laws, resale price maintenance laws, price discrimination
laws, and trade-mark laws affect the substance of commercial bargains. Nevertheless, both
union and employer remain free to use their bargaining strength to seek substantive
terms according to their own scale of priorities.
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gaining to impasse, change the terms and conditions of employment
by unilateral action or individual bargaining.25 The union can strike,
but the employer may then hire replacements, again establishing the
terms of employment by unilateral action or individual bargaining.20
These measures have varying degrees of effectiveness, depending on
the relative economic position of the parties. But the important point
is that the collective agreement is the product of economic pressures,
not legal compulsion. Nor does the law compel the individual to agree.
It forecloses him from bargaining for different terms, but it does leave
him the alternative, however hard it may be, of seeking work elsewhere
if he is unwilling to work under the terms of the collective agreement.
Furthermore, collective agreements are not unique in being framed
under legal compulsion.27 The ancient common law required innkeep-
ers to take in the traveler 28 and common carriers to accept shipments. 2
The modem public utility's duty to provide service is defined by law,80
and automobile insurance companies may be compelled to accept their
share of assigned risks.31 The individual telephone subscriber is as
much foreclosed from bargaining as the individual employee and has
even less freedom to contract elsewhere. Nor are the economic pres-
sures to agree any less compelling in many other bargaining relation-
ships. Monopoly or oligopoly positions- not at all uncommon in our
economy--can preclude or closely limit certain bargaining alternatives.
If a manufacturer fails to agree with the producer of a patented ma-
chine, the substitute may be even less satisfactory than strikebreakers
hired by a struck employer. In many business relationships the parties
may be as mutually dependent on each other as a union and an em-
ployer. Exclusive dealerships and sole sources of supply may create re-
lationships which make any interruption far more costly to one or
both parties than a strike.
82
The compulsory character of union-employer bargaining cannot be
25. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949); cf. Bowman, Era-
ployers' Unilaterial Action-An Unfair Labor Practice? 9 VAND. L. Rxv. 487 (1956).
26. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Note, Replacement of
Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630 (1966).
27. See Lenhoff, The Scope of Compulsory Contracts Proper, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 587
(1943); Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943).
28. J. BEALE, THE LAW OF INNKEEPERS AND HomLs chs. VI-VIII (1906).
29. See I. REDFiELD, CARRiERs 108 (1869).
30. See Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope anl
Enforcement, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 312 (1962).
31. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-130 (Supp. 1969); ILL. RtV. STAT. ch. 951/2,
§ 7-501 (1957); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.70 (1965).
32. Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE
Lj. 1135 (1957).
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ignored, nor should its importance be minimized. This characteristic
of the bargaining process must shape the legal rules governing the col-
lective agreement which results. But the collective agreement is not for
this reason so unique that it should be considered a thing apart, for
many other contractual relations are creatures of legal compulsion or
are pressed upon the parties by compelling economic forces.
4. Continuous Relationship with Successive Agreements
In form, most collective agreements are for a fixed term; at the end
of the term, the agreement expires and the parties negotiate a new
agreement for another fixed term. In practice, however, the relation-
ship continues unbroken from term to term. The parties understand
that although successive agreements are discrete documents, they do
not fragment the rights and duties they create into insulated time
units. Seniority rights continue to accumulate, unbroken by successive
agreements; 33 vacation rights earned under one agreement are enjoyed
under the next;34 and an employee discharged during one contract
term may be reinstated by an arbitration proceeding held during the
next contract term.35 Even though a strike interrupts production, it
does not break the essential continuity of the relationship. During the
strike, the parties may have few, if any, contractual obligations to each
other. But when the strike is settled, the new agreement normally
picks up where the old agreement left off, much as if there had been
no strike. Seniority is not broken, accrued vacation or pension rights
are not destroyed, and grievances in process continue on to arbitration.
Although successive agreements alter some of the terms of the rela-
tionship, most of the rights and duties, both substantive and proce-
dural, customarily continue unchanged. Periodic negotiations are, in
fact, not for the making of new agreements, but for modifications of the
old. Nor do the parties consider an agreement as more than an interim
settlement, a transitory stage in their continuing relationship. Even
before accepting the terms of one agreement they may be looking for-
ward to the demands to be made in the next negotiations. This char-
33. Seniority provisions can be altered by successive agreements, but in practice the
changes are minor and infrequent. If the collective bargaining relation terminates so that
the union no longer represents the employees, then seniority rights may disappear. See
Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HAnv.
L. REv. 1532 (1962); Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change: Zdanoh v. Glid-
den Co., 47 MINN. L. REv. 505 (1963).
34. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 1967); Note, Treatment of Mone-
tary Fringe Benefits and Post Termination Survival of the Right to Job Security 72 YA"
LJ. 162 (1962).
35. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U-S. 593 (1960).
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acteristic of the collective agreement as a periodic renegotiation of
terms in a continuing relationship makes it quite unlike a simple sales
contract, promissory note, or surety agreement which states the terms
for a single transaction. But again, this does not make the collective
agreement a stranger in the family of contracts. Periodic leases, subject
to repeated renegotiation and renewal, may be used to regulate long.
term rental arrangements. Continuing arrangements for lines of credit
may be expressed in a succession of separate contracts. Franchises, deal-
erships, and requirements contracts may also establish continuing re-
lationships which are modified by periodic renegotiation. 0
There is no need to identify and describe further distinguishing
characteristics of the collective agreement here. It should already be
plain that although collective agreements differ greatly from "ordinary
bargains of commerce," they are full members of the contract family.
Many other contractual relationships also differ greatly from "ordinary
bargains of commerce" and share one or more of the marked charac-
teristics of collective agreements. The uniqueness of collective agree-
ments is matched by the uniqueness of many other contracts, and none
should be disowned as club-footed cousins simply because they are in
some sense not "ordinary contracts."
B. The Contractual Character of Collective Agreements
From the social point of view, the collective agreement may have
more "contractualness" 37 than many other bargained transactions. Pro-
fessor Macaulay has measured contracts in terms of two distinct ele-
ments: (1) rational planning with provision for future contingencies,
and (2) the existence or use of actual or potential legal sanctions. 8
The collective agreement is pre-eminently an instrument of private
planning, and its qualities of complexity and continuity reflect the im-
portance of its planning function. It not only establishes rules govern-
ing the relations of union and employer but also enacts regulations
governing the terms and conditions of employment of all the employees
in the bargaining unit. Although its provisions seem general and in-
complete, as they are continued from one contract to the next they
36. As a result of both state and federal statutes, the automobile manufacturer-dealer
relationship has now become "a kind of compulsory contract; manufacturers must con-
tinue relationships with dealers unless a dealer has in some way violated a duty tinder
the franchise." S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER; Tim AUTOMOflIU MANU-
FAcruRERS AND THEIR DraLrps 198 (1966?.
37. The term is Professor Macaulay s.
38. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
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are supplemented by the common law of the shop, gaining explicit-
ness through the parties' acceptance of practices, grievance settlements,
and arbitration awards. Troublesome gaps are filled and disputes re-
solved by modifications in the agreement. Deliberate ambiguities may
remain and unforeseen contingencies do arise, but the parties plan for
these by creating a structured grievance procedure, customarily ending
in arbitration, which will enable them to clarify the rules, adjust to
changed conditions, and modify their relationship as problems arise.
"The trade agreement thus becomes, as it were, the industrial consti-
tution of the enterprise." 39 When measured against the complexity of
the relationship they govern, collective agreements provide more de-
tailed planning and make more complete provision for contingencies,
both foreseen and unforeseen, than many of the commercial contracts
with which they are often unfavorably compared.
The second element of "contractualness"-the existence or use of
legal sanctions-is more difficult to measure in collective agreements.
The received tradition is that compliance with collective agreements
does not rest upon legal compulsion but upon the parties' recognition
of their moral responsibility and their mutual self-interest in good
faith dealing. Whether this is any more true for collective agreements
than for other contractual relations is not at all clear. Certainly, legal
sanctions for breach of collective agreements do exist and are used.
Under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act collective
agreements are legally enforceable in both federal and state courts,
and most collective agreements are so drawn as to make the full range
of legal sanctions available.40 Court actions to compel arbitration, to
enforce awards, for back pay, or for damages due to strikes are reported
daily, and NLRB procedures to remedy breaches of contract are in-
creasingly invoked.41 The parties, in negotiating and administering
their agreement, cannot help but be aware of the available legal sanc-
tions and inevitably consider using them to compel compliance, at
least as a last resort. Even though these legal sanctions may be seldom
used, they significantly affect the relationship in many instances.
Enforcement of collective agreements is admittedly largely through
grievance arbitration, but this method is, at most, only one step re-
89. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 1940).
40. For exceptional clauses foreclosing the right to sue, see BrREMu oF NA-ToNAL
AFFAIms, COLLECTIVE BALGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONmrAcrs 77:155 (1967). The most
noted example is the collective agreement between the United Mine Workers and the
Bituminous Coal Operators' Assodation, id.
41. NLRB v. Strong, 390 U.S. 920 (1969); NLRB v. C & C Pl)%%wood Corp., 385 U.S.
421 (1967); C g: S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 62 L.R.R.M. 1013 (195.
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moved from legal sanctions. Arbitration is, in many respects, a surro-
gate for the courts. It is a process of adjudication by third persons
when the parties to the agreement cannot agree on its meaning or are
unwilling to overlook violations.42 It interprets and applies the agree-
ment, determines the scope and seriousness of the violation, and pre-
scribes the remedial action to be taken. When an arbitration clause is
present in the collective agreement the process can be judicially com-
pelled 4 3 the procedure is subject to judicial supervision, 44 and the
award can be judicially enforced. That only a small fraction of griev-
ances end in arbitration does not measure the importance of this
method of enforcement. The process of grievance settlement, indeed
the nature of the entire relationship, is entirely different when arbi-
tration is available as a last resort. Moreover, arbitration is not always
relegated to last-resort status but is often used as an integral part of
administering the agreement. If we view grievance arbitration as a
form of legal enforcement, in fact, we might well conclude that the
collective agreement is among the most litigation-prone of all contrac-
tual relations. Anyone familiar with labor arbitration cannot help but
be impressed-or more accurately, depressed-by the large number of
litigated issues which are trivial and worthless, which represent no
conflict of principle but only a clash of personalities. Many cases are
brought to arbitration without any serious efforts to settle, or adjudi-
cation is sought because the officers of the union, or management, or
both, are unwilling to accept responsibility for agreeing to an ines-
capable result. Businessmen who insisted on litigating such matters
with customers or suppliers would soon have few of either, but the
compulsory quality of the collective bargaining relation binds the
parties together regardless of their litigiousness. In many collective
bargaining relationships the loss of goodwill is counted of little conse-
quence and resort to arbitration is considered the normal and accept-
able way of conducting affairs. "Contractualness" in terms of enforce-
ment through a process of litigation and adjudication then becomes
the most marked characteristic of the collective bargaining relationship.
Implicit in the foregoing has been the proposition that contracts
are not all alike. They have differences, substantial and important
differences. Collective agreements are not "ordinary contracts," but
42. For a comparison of the role of an arbitrator and a judge in applying and enforcing
contracts, see Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in COLLEcTIVE BARCAININO
AND THE ARBITmATOR'S ROLE 8 (1962).
43. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
44. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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neither are construction contracts, lease purchase agreements, require-
ments contracts, dealership franchises, insurance policies, stock certif-
icates, and a lawyer's retainer. The term "contract" describes a family
of relationships, but within that family are many genuses, and the col-
lective agreement is one genus in that family. It is not some fearful
and marvelous mutation, to be treated as an outcast or a stranger; it is
a full-fledged contract which bears in marked degree the essential ele-
ments of contractualness.
II. The Usefulness of Contract Law for Collective Agreements: Rules,
Tools, and Doctrines
Once it is recognized that collective agreements do belong within
the contract family, logic would seem to require that the law of con-
tracts be applicable to them, and that the legal rules and principles
developed to govern contractual relations generally should be useful
in defining the rights and duties created by collective agreements.
Logic, however, cannot erase the stubborn fact that these rules and
principles will often make mischief if imported into the collective
bargaining context. There is a core of truth in the assertion that col-
lective agreements are not "ordinary contracts," and therefore that
"ordinary contract law" is not applicable to them. The drawing of
analogies between collective agreements and "ordinary contracts" is
no substitute for specific consideration of the extent to which the rules
and principles of contract law are appropriate and useful in applica-
tion to collective agreements.
To begin with, contract law gives no useful guidance in defining
rights and duties under collective agreements if contract rules are ap-
plied or ignored from case to case on an ad hoc basis. We gain nothing
if courts appeal to "ordinary principles of contract law" when the ques-
tion is whether an oral agreement is effective before the written con-
tract is signed,45 but then find "no satisfactory solvent in conventional
contract or corporate law" when the question is whether the collective
agreement survives a corporate merger .4 Such hopscotch applications
serve only to display contract law as a mistress of convenience, capable
45. Genesco, Inc. v. Joint Council 13, United Shoe Workers, 341 F.2d 482. 489 (2d
Cir. 1965), discussed in Note, Section 301(a) and the Federal Common Law of Labor
Agreements, 75 YALE L.J. 877 (1966); United Steelworkers v. C.C.I. Corp., 395 F.2d 529.
533 (10th Cir. 1968).
46. Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Draftsmen's Ass'n, 593 F.2d 407 (Ist
Cir. 1968), following the Supreme Court's similar language and result in John Wiley &
Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).
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of troublemaking by jealous insistence on being recognized at the
wrong time. It is clear, however, that certain types of contract rules
are more susceptible to such hit or miss application than others, and
hence are more likely to cause difficulty.
First, contract rules which attempt to define with some specificity or
detail rights and duties of parties are largely useless and often mislead-
ing when applied to collective agreements. These rules may be distilled
from court decisions-more accurately, from those decisions which
contract scholars read-but these decisions may involve types of con-
tracts which are significantly different from collective agreements, Pro-
fessor Corbin has ten sections on employment contracts, all of them
studded with rules quite contrary to those developed under collective
agreements. 47 He states, for example, that willful disobedience of rea.
sonable orders is grounds for discharge,48 but thousands of arbitration
decisions have held otherwise, finding that insubordination justified
only reprimand or disciplinary lay-off. Again, Professor Corbin states
that an employee's refusal to do work which is not a part of his job is
not wrongful, 49 but arbitrators have almost uniformly held that refusal
to obey such orders makes the employee liable for discipline. He must
obey and file a grievance unless there is serious risk to his health or
safety. The section on term of service does not even mention the prin-
ciple of seniority which permeates most collective agreements.50 Pro-
fessor Corbin, to be sure, accurately summarized the working rules
governing those employment contracts which generate court decisions
-professional and white collar employments for a term and not sub-
ject to collective agreements. But most industrial employment is at
will, with security provided by collective agreements, and employments
at will produce few court decisions. Not surprisingly, the legal rules
developed to regulate one type of employment relationship are ill-
suited to regulate the other.
Second, even contract rules cast in broader terms as being generally
applicable to various types of contracts may be misconceived and lead
to unwanted results when applied to collective agreements. Professor
Corbin treats collective agreements as contracts made for the benefit
of third persons, and quite properly so.51 The union and the employer
clearly intend to provide benefits for the individual employees, and
47. 3A CORBIN §§ 674-83 (1962).
48. Id. § 679.
49. Id. § 683.
50. Id. § 684.
51. Id. §§ 781 n.35, 782 nn.17-18.
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the individual employees acquire legally enforceable rights under the
agreement.5 2 But some of the general rules developed for other third
party beneficiary contracts simply do not fit the collective bargaining
relation. Black letter law tells us that "[a] donee beneficiary . .. may
... render the duty to himself inoperative from the beginning by dis-
claimer, ' 53 and Professor Corbin states flatly, "There is no question
that... a release sealed and delivered by him [the beneficiary], a sub-
stituted contract or novation, an accord and satisfaction, may all be
operative to discharge his right against the promisor."54 This rule,
however, cannot be applied to collective agreements. As the Supreme
Court said twenty-five years ago, "the individual contract cannot be
effective as a waiver of any benefit to which the employee otherwise
would be entitled under the trade agreement."55 To permit individual
employees to disclaim benefits or to modify by novation or accord and
satisfaction would defeat the fundamental purposes of the collective
bargaining statutes which provide the legal framework for collective
agreements.
Black letter law also tells us that the rights of the donee beneficiary
cannot be discharged or modified by the contracting parties unless the
power to do so is reserved, and the reservation must ordinarily be ex-
pressed in specific terms.", Unions and employers, however, must have
the power mutually to terminate or amend their agreements. Other-
wise, agreements for terms long enough to provide stability in the bar-
gaining relationship might impose an unbearable rigidity upon the
union-employer relationship. The courts have never questioned the
parties' power to amend the collective agreement and alter the rights
of the employee even though this power is not expressly reserved, at
least so long as the amendment is made according to the same proce-
dure as the original agreement.57 The power of the union to surrender
or compromise the beneficial rights of an individual member by settle-
ment of his grievance is less clear, but at least the union can foreclose
the individual's rights by good faith and non-arbitrary decisions as to
the merits of particular grievances. 8 The union's power does not,
however, depend on any express reservation in the collective agree-
52. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1952).
53. RSTATEmr OF CorrrAcTs § 137 (1932).
54, 4 CoRBiN § 811, at 235 (1962).
55. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 US. 332, 338 (1944).
56. RESTATnmNT oF CoNTRAcTs § 42 (1932); 4 CoRmNm § 814 (1962).
57. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), particularly the separate opinions of
Mr. Justice Goldberg and Ir. Justice Harlan.
58. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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ment, but on the judicially conceived needs of the collective bargain-
ing relation and of grievance settlement procedures."
These general third party beneficiary rules do not work when ap-
plied to collective agreements for the simple reason that they were
distilled largely from court decisions dealing with quite different types
of third party transactions. The donee beneficiary cases which provide
the precedents are heavily weighted with two types of transactions-
intra-family gifts and designation of beneficiaries of life insurance.10
The resulting legal rules, rooted in part in the ancient law of gifts,01
are shaped to fit the facts before the court, and only with blind luck
will they fit other types of transactions. Indeed, Professor Corbin found
it necessary to tailor third party beneficiary principles to fit liability
insurance,0 2 and declared them quite inadequate to solve problems
posed by group insurance.03
Such rules fail to fit collective agreements because they are cast in
broader terms than either precedent or practical need justifies. What-
ever may be the core of common principles applicable to all forms of
third party beneficiary contracts-and I suspect it is a small but solid
core-most of the supposedly general rules are not in fact generally
applicable. The interrelation of rights and duties of the three parties
as articulated by the courts must reflect the special character of the
transaction in question. It would be startling, indeed frightening, if
the same legal rules defined the insurance company-insured-beneficiary
relationship, the water company-city-homeowner relationship, and the
employer-union-employee relationship. The complex of rights and du-
ties interrelating the employer, the union and the individual employee
59. On the other side of the coin, black letter law states that a promisor can set up as
a defense against the third party beneficiary, the failure by the promisee to perform con-
ditions precedent on counterclaims against the promisee arising out of breaches by the
promisee of his duties under the same contract. RESrATE,,IENT OF CONTRACTs § 140 (1932);
4 CORBIN § 819 (1951). But in Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 351 U.S. 459 (1960), the Su-
preme Court had to repudiate Professor Corbin's statement of these rules. The employer,
when sued for payments due to the pension and welfare fund, attempted to set off dam-
ages resulting from strikes in violation of the agreement. The Court refused to allow
the setoff, declaring that this was "not a typical third party beneficiary contract," and
pointing out that such a setoff would amount to the employer's recouping his losses
from the union's breach by reducing the wages due to employees. This would run counter
to the principle expressed in Section 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1964), that judgments against a union should be enforceable only against the union and
its assets and not against any individual member or his assets.
60. See 4 CORBIN § 782 (1951), and illustrations in RESrATEMENT OF CONTAarS §§133,
135, 139, 142 (1932). Contracts within the family have historically been subject to special
rules, or common rules have been rather specially applied. See McDowell, Contracts in
the Family, 45 B.U.L. Rav. 43 (1965).
61. See 4 CORBIN § 811, at 237, § 814, at 254 (1962).
62. Id. § 813 (Supp. 1964).
63. Id. § 814, at 251-53 (1962).
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must meet the practical needs of collective bargaining; it must reflect
the union's statutory status as exclusive representative; and it must
safeguard the individual from arbitrary collective action. Other third
party beneficiary contracts undoubtedly have their institutional imper-
atives, their controlling legal framework, and perhaps their conflict be-
tween individual and collective rights. But the needs of each type of
contract may dictate quite special rules. Through these varied sets of
rules may well run some common threads or even working principles.
But surely they are not the narrowly conceived rules which now pass
for the law of third party beneficiary contracts.
Third, certain analytical constructs from the law of contracts may
be of some use in analyzing rights and duties and in rationalizing de-
cisions under collective agreements. For example, the distinctions be-
tween promises and conditions,64 or between total and partial breachG3
may be helpful in defining the rights and duties of the parties. These
analytical tools, however, give little real guidance to sound results. In-
deed, if they are relied upon to provide more than a logical structure
or verbal formulation of the results, they may be more misleading
than helpful.66 A couple of not-so-hypothetical cases will illustrate the
usefulness and limitation of contract law at this level.
A collective agreement provided that, "The employer shall give the
union 48 hours' notice of all temporary lay-offs." Because of the ur-
gent need to catch up on repairs and maintenance, the employer de-
cided on Monday afternoon to shut down for the next two days, and so
notified the union. The union filed a grievance claiming two days' pay
for all the employees laid off on the grounds that the required notice
was a condition precedent to the employer's right of lay-off. The em-
ployer contended that his obligation to give notice was a bare promise,
and that its breach had caused only nominal damage because the em-
ployees were destined to lose two days' pay in any case. The question
seems to be whether the notice requirement is characterized as a condi-
tion or as a bare promise, but we cannot, by asking which it is, deter-
mine the result. The inquiry must start at the other end and ask which
result best reflects the parties' intent and fulfills their purposes. The
distinction between promise and condition then becomes a device for
articulating that result within a logical framework.
In another case, a collective agreement made with one employer re-
64. REsrATEmNT oF CoNmRAcrs § 260 (1932).
65. REsrATnmNT OF CoNmAcTs § 313 (1932).
66. "You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition
in a contract." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897).
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quiring payments into pension, welfare, and group insurance funds
provided, "The union will not make an agreement more favorable to
any other warehouse in the Port of New York, or in such event will
simultaneously modify this agreement to conform therewith." 07 The
union then made agreements with other warehouses which did not re-
quire such payments. The first employer had various courses of action
open to him. He could (a) sue the union for damages and to compel
modification of the agreement; (b) refuse to make payments into the
pension, welfare, and insurance funds; or (c) declare the collective
agreement at an end. It may be helpful to analyze the problem in
terms of whether the "most favored nation clause" was a promise, a
condition precedent, or both; and if it was a condition, what promise
of the employer was made conditional. This analysis may focus our
attention on the variety of solutions available, but it does not tell us
which solution is the most sensible. Nor do Restatement-type rules give
much guidance. Choosing a solution requires more than simple inquiry
into the parties' intent; it requires the weighing of a wide range of
considerations, including the effect of the solution on the integrity of
the pension fund, the need for protecting the employees' insurance
rights, the financial responsibility of the union, the extent to which
employees should suffer for the union's default, and the importance
of maintaining the stability of the collective bargaining relationship. 0
The language of "promise," "condition," or "promissory condition"
provides the verbal formulation for expressing the solution, but the
solution must be dictated by the institutional needs and social consid-
erations radiating from the collective agreement as a planning transac-
tion. 69
Fourth, certain broad contract doctrines such as material breach
and failure of consideration may similarly provide persuasive ratio-
nales for results. Again, however, they give little guidance in the choice
of specific solutions. The doctrine of material breach seems to have
substantive content and working guidelines, but these are largely il-
lusory. For example, if a union strikes in violation of a no-strike clause
67. Erie Basin Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Warehousemens Local 976.4, 68 L.R.R.M.2055 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). We put to the side here questions whether this provision violates
the antitrust laws. See United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 881 U.S. 657(1965).
68. See Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960).69. The familiar formula that the construction of the contract "depends on all of the
circumstances of the case," appears to be little more than a device by which the courtis able to achieve what it regards as the most just result under the circumstances of the
case. Atiyah, Judicial Techniques and the English Law of Contracts, 2 OTrAWA L. REv.
337 (1968).
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in the agreement, the doctrine might be invoked as in Marathon Elec-
tric:70
[T]he prevention of strikes is one of the principal purposes of la-
bor contracts and of the Act. A no-strike provision is "The chief
advantage which an employer can reasonably expect from a collec-
tive labor agreement." The walkout was a material breach which
justified the subsequent rescission of the contract by the Company. 1
The logic is appealingly neat and persuasive-until one examines the
result. In this case, the union had insisted that a two-cent wage increase
provided for in the agreement be put into immediate effect. This de-
mand, though improper, was not without rational basis. When the
Company refused, the union called a meeting during working hours,
causing a walkout. The Company then locked the plant gates, refused
to allow any employees to return to work, and notified the union that
because of the strike in breach of the collective agreement the Com-
pany was cancelling the agreement. The Company advertised for new
employees and gave no priority to old employees, taking them back
only as new applicants with no seniority. The result was a total dis-
tuption of the collective bargaining relation, destruction of employees'
job security and seniority rights, and such serious aggravation of the
dispute that labor peace became impossible. Yet the Company's re-
sponse, the court held, had been proper because the walkout was a
"material breach."
What the court failed to recognize is that the word "material," as
used in the doctrine of "material breach," is not a synonym for
"important" or "major," describing an objective quality. Instead, it is a
word of art given content only by the results it describes. Thus the
Restatement, after black lettering some "general principles based on
inherent justice" says:
The question then to be answered is: Will it be more conformable
to justice in the particular case to free the injured party, or, on the
other hand, to require him to perform his promise, in both cases
giving him a right of action if the failure to perform was wrong-
ful. 72
In applying the doctrine to collective agreements, the question is not
whether prevention of strikes is the "principal purpose" of the contract
or the "chief advantage" expected by the employer. The question is
70. Electrical Workers Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
71. 223 F.2d at 341.
72. RsrATE?,fENr OF CoNTrmcrs § 275, comment a (1932).
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whether allowing the employer to terminate the agreement will do
justice between the employer, the union, and the employees, aid the
continuing relations of the parties, promote the statutory purposes of
collective bargaining, and protect the social interest in labor peace.
Only when the weighing of all relevant considerations tips the balance
in favor of those consequences which follow from allowing the em-
ployer to terminate is the strike a "material breach."
There are at least three dangers in the use of analytical tools or doc-
trines of contract law such as those just discussed. The first has already
been made quite plain. Because they seem to provide guides for making
decisions, they may divert attention from the essential inquiry, as in
Marathon Electric. The court there did not even consider whether
fairness between the parties, as well as institutional and social needs,
might be better served by a different solution. The court did not weigh
other alternatives, such as leaving the collective agreement in effect
to stabilize the relationship and providing the employer with remedies
in the courts for breach of contract and remedies before the NLRB for
violation of Section 8(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act.
Because the court was led into asking the wrong question, it was led to
the wrong result.
The second danger is that these doctrines suggest either-or answers;
the breach is either material or it is not and the two alternatives pro-
vide only two results. More carefully tailored solutions may be over-
looked. In Mastro Plastics,73 the employer sought to supplant the in-
cumbent union with a more friendly and compliant union. As a part
of that effort, the employer discharged an employee who continued ac-
tively to support the incumbent union. This triggered a strike by other
supporters of the incumbent union despite a broad no-strike clause in
the collective agreement prohibiting "any strike or work stoppage."
The Supreme Court held that in view of the statutory policies sur-
rounding the agreement, the words "any strike" should not be read to
prohibit strikes to protest employer unfair labor practices. Therefore,
the strike did not violate the agreement. It has been urged that the
Court, rather than violate the plain meaning of the words, should have
held that the employer's frontal attack on the very existence of the
bargaining representative was a material breach excusing the union
from its no-strike obligation. 74 But use of material breach analysis tends
to force a choice between leaving the no-strike clause standing un-
73. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 US. 270 (1956).
74. Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 Mimi. L. REv. 1,
18 (1958).
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touched or destroying it entirely. We ought at least to consider the
advantages of the Court's intermediate solution of permitting the
union to strike against grossly unfair labor practices while leaving the
no-strike obligation otherwise intact. Material breach analysis does
not foreclose this result, but does obscure its availability.
The third and most serious danger is that use of these common
contract doctrines invites the borrowing of precedents from other con-
tractual settings which may have involved quite different considera-
tions.75 Even Professor Corbin has fallen into this trap. In Drake
Bakeries,76 the employer rescheduled work because Christmas and New
Years came on Fridays. The employees were told not to report on the
Thursdays preceding the holidays but to report on the Saturdays fol-
lowing them. The union insisted that this rescheduling violated the
collective agreement, and when discussions proved unfruitful, the em-
ployees refused to report on Saturday. The employer sued the union
for damages for breach of the no-strike clause, and the union moved
to stay the suit pending arbitration. Professor Corbin, extrapolating
from non-labor cases, generalized that a party who repudiates an arbi-
tration agreement or commits a breach "of a kind that destroys the end
and aim of the arbitration provision itself" has no right to arbitration.
He then argued that in collective agreements
[t]he purpose of the arbitration is to insure continuous production
and avoid strikes; a strike is itself a breach (and repudiation) of
the agreement to arbitrate.77
From this he concluded that the strike had defeated a vital purpose of
75. See, e.g., the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Lewis v. Benedict
Coal Corp., 561 U.S. 459, 471 (1960). It assumes that because "fairness and justice" usually
require that in third party beneficiary contracts the promisor can set off against the bene-ficiary counterclaims he has against the promisee, the same result is required in collective
agreements. But "fairness and justice" is not such a fungible concept, nor is it a tail
attached to certain legal rules. An employee under a collective agreement, unlike mostdonee beneficiaries, is not an object of charity or bounteous generosity-lhe has to work for
what he gets. The question is whether it is "fair and just," after he has done his work.
to deduct from his paycheck or pension rights losses suffered by the employer due to
strikes engaged in by other employees and tolerated by the union. It may be that some
legal doctrines "represent an accumulation of tested wisdom ... bottomed upon notions
of fairness and sound public policy, and it would be a foolish waste to climb the ladder
all over again .... " Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, in
UNIVERsITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL SUMMER INsTrruE, Cou.Ecrxv BARGAINING AND THE
LAw 121 (1958), quoted in the dissenting opinion at 476. But contract doctrines need tobe constantly retested, for as Professor Corbin emphasized, they are never more than
"working rules," and the need for retesting is imperative when those doctrines are to be
applied to different types of transactions: It may not be amiss to climb the ladder all
over again, if, when we look about, we find that we are in the wrong tree.76. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
afJ'g 294 F.2d 399, rev'd on rehearing en banc 287 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1961).
77. 6A CoraN § 1443, at 436 (1962).
545
The Yale Law Journal
the bargaining and had excused the employer from his duty to arbi-
trate.7 8 The union could not stay the employer's suit for breach of the
no-strike clause, nor could it demand arbitration of the dispute which
it had sought to resolve by strike.70 The Supreme Court, however,
came to the opposite conclusion;80 and when another federal court
followed suit8l Professor Corbin protested this judicial perversity:
How the court can hold that this Union's declared strike on
February 7 was itself arbitrable is not understandable. Are all
collective bargains to be taken wholly out of the law of contracts?
Are employers the only parties who are bound?
82
This cry of outrage speaks faithfully from the body of legal rules and
precedents which starts with the premise that "a general agreement to
arbitrate all future disputes ... is contrary to public policy and void."
3
And it flows naturally from rules which Professor Corbin argued reflect
a judicial distrust of the competency, objectivity, and fairness of arbi-
trators.8 4 A party who seeks to enforce a promise which is oppressive to
the other party and distasteful to the courts will be required to walk
the straight and narrow.
But quite opposite premises underlie labor arbitration. The Supreme
Court has declared a preference for arbitration because the arbitrator's
special competence is beyond that of the "ablest judge," and because
of "the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the
shop and their trust in his personal judgment."85 When a union, as in
Drake Bakeries, takes collective action to protest or counteract an em-
ployer's decision, the principles underlying the doctrine of material
78. Id. 440.
79. Professor Corbin argued strongly in favor of the first decision of the Court of
Appeals in Drake Bakeries. See also Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Necdham
Packing Co., 254 Iowa 882, 119 N.W.2d 141 (1963).
80. After the Supreme Court decision, see note 76 supra, Professor Corbin partially
recanted, acknowledging that there was a question whether the one-day abstention was
a "strike" or even a breach of the agreement. The issue of breach vel non was, after all,
within the coverage of the arbitration clause. Since the union's one-day abstention had
been in the good faith belief that the employer had breached the agreement by ordering
employees to work that day, there was no repudiation of the arbitration provision. But
Professor Corbin held firm to his position that a forbidden strike barred the union from
enforcing arbitration. 6A CoRIN § 1443, at 47 (Supp. 1964).
The Supreme Court again disappointed Professor Corbin by overruling Needham
Packing, supra note 79, 376 U.S. 247 (1964). As if to rub salt In his wounds, the Court
quoted the paragraph in Drake Bakeries, 370 U.S. at 262-63, which had cited Professor
Corbin's prior edition as its chief authority. 376 U.S. at 251-52.
81. Local 748, International Union of Electrical Workers v. Jefferson City Cabinet Co.,
314 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1963).
82. 6A CoRBIN § 14,43, at 49-50 n.33.5 (Supp. 1964).
83. 6 CoRBIN § 1443, at 388.
84. Id. at 392-94.
85. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 482 (1960).
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breach require the court to make a considered choice between the
results which follow from ordering arbitration as against those which
will follow from not ordering arbitration, and to determine which willbe more conformable to justice in the particular case. Ordering arbi-
tration works no injustice. Both the union's claim that the employer's
rescheduling violates the collective agreement and the employer's claim
that the union's preventing Saturday work violates the no-strike clause
will be adjudicated by the tribunal which the parties have agreed was
most competent and appropriate to interpret these provisions of the col-lective agreement. That tribunal has full power to order whatever
remedy is appropriate to fulfill the purposes of the parties' agreement.
Denying arbitration can, at best, transfer adjudication of these claims
to the court-a tribunal which the parties agreed was second best, whichhas itself confessed its limited competence, and which has an indepen-
dent interest in avoiding the burden of deciding such disputes. The
more likely result of denying arbitration is that part or all of the dispute
will never reach the deliberative judicial process but will be fought out
with economic force in the form of strikes, discharges, and lockouts.
Denying arbitration may serve to penalize the union-before it is de-
cided that the union has violated the contract-at the expense of bur-dening the court and jeopardizing the social interest in stability of thebargaining relationship, with no advantages to the employer other than
the possibility that the court will give him a better decision than he
originally bargained for when he agreed to arbitration.
Summary
The law of contracts, so far as it consists of specific legal rules,
analytical tools and manipulative doctrines, has little usefulness in
application to collective agreements. Indeed, if the law of contracts
does not go beyond this level of legal propositions, the law of collective
agreements should insist on emancipation, if not disown family affilia-
tion altogether.
The legal rules and doctrines discussed above are only illustrations
which could be more than matched by examples drawn from contractlaw on offer and acceptance, consideration, joint and several contracts,
liability of successors, or the Statute of Frauds. The specific contract
rules in these areas, if not patently irrelevant or preposterous, are aslikely to lead us astray as to guide us aright, and there is no magic to
tell us which rules to trust. Analytical devices and doctrines appear toguide but can be used to point in any direction, and precedents based
on different transactions too often point the wrong way. Sad experience
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has taught labor lawyers to distrust instinctively any arbitration or
court opinion that cites the Restatement of Contracts or one of the
classic treatises. If the law of contracts has nothing more to offer than
black letter rules and precedent-burdened doctrines, the law of collec-
tive agreements will probably develop more sensibly if it is built as an
independent body of law.
But the law of contracts must be more than this-the black letter of
the Restatement, the confident propositions in treatises, and the tradi-
tional first year law school course notwithstanding. As we have already
seen, the doctrine of material breach is analytically circular, verbally
deceptive, and productive of misleading precedents. Underneath the
words and precedents, however, that doctrine is a command to the
courts to find the result which will be most conformable to justice in
the particular case. The doctrine does not provide a mechanical answer,
but it does free the court to weigh a broad range of considerations in
determining a result. In all of the three cases discussed, Marathon
Electric, Mastro Plastics, and Drake Bakeries, sensitive awareness of
this underlying principle would have been helpful to the Court in
making and articulating its decisions. This suggests the level at which
the law of contracts may be useful to the law of collective agreements.
It is to such principles that we now turn.
III. The Usefulness of Contract Law for Collective Agreements:
Principles of Interpretation, Completion, and Revision
If we peel off the layers of specific rules and general doctrines we may
find underneath certain basic principles of contract law which can
make constructive contributions to the law of collective agreements.
Professor Corbin has articulated at least some of those principles in a
way which makes them particularly meaningful for labor lawyers.
These principles, however, serve less as rules for deciding specific cases
than as cautionary guards against reliance on rules. Perhaps their most
practical function is to protect collective agreements from being victim-
ized by bad contract law. The principles with which we deal here are
those which guide the courts in interpreting, elaborating, and shaping
the agreement of the parties.
A. Interpretation, A Task of Translation
Collective agreements are expressed in the form of written docu-
ments, and the principles for interpreting written agreements are, of
course, applicable in interpreting the words of collective agreements.
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But as Professor Corbin has so vigorously emphasized, the function of
interpretation is to search for the meaning which the parties sought to
express in the words used, to translate their words so as to achieve their
intended result.86 The rules of interpretation are helpful only if they
"lead to consideration of the various meanings of language that are
worthy of comparison. They will be harmful if they are taken as
dogmatic directions that must be followed, or if they mislead us into
thinking that language has only one meaning, the one absolutely
correct.117 It was the simplistic dogmatism that words in a collective
agreement could have only one true meaning, and that the meaning
given to them by the judges, which underlay the Cutler-Hammer doc-
trine that if the judge saw no ambiguity in the provision of a collective
agreement sought to be arbitrated, there was no "dispute" and, there-
fore, nothing to arbitrate.88 This doctrine, which had a crippling effect
on labor arbitration, was repudiated by the Supreme Court in the
Steelworkers Cases as the product of a "preoccupation with ordinary
contract law,"89 in effect using the word "ordinary" as a synonym for
"inapplicable."
One general principle of contract interpretation vigorously articu-
lated by Professor Corbin is that meaning cannot be discovered "by
poring over the words within the four corners of the paper."'0 Before a
court can select one meaning in preference to other possible ones,
"extrinsic evidence shall be heard to make the court aware of the
,surrounding circumstances,' including the persons, objects and events
to which the words can be applied."0' This principle of looking beyond
the bare words to the surrounding circumstances is of fundamental
importance in interpreting collective agreements. The words used may
be common words which have uncommon meanings; the provisions are
often sparsely stated without the adornment of definitions, qualifica-
tions, or specifications of scope; and the surrounding circumstances
encompass the whole employment relationship-the processes of pro-
duction, the history of the bargaining relationship, the past practices
of the parties, and even the industrial jurisprudence which has evolved
86. For a demonstration of the inadequacy of linguistics to resolve disputes about the
meaning of written contracts, see Young, Equivocation in the Making of Agreements. 64
CoLum. L. Rav. 619 (1964). See also Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76
YALE L.J. 939 (1967); Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treat-
ment of a Sick Rule, 53 COmE.L L. REv. 1036 (1968); cf. Patterson, The Interpretation
and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. Rav. 833, 845-46 (1964).
87. 3 CORBIN § 535, at 21 (1962).
88. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917. 67
N.Y.S.2d 317, affTd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
89. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564. 567 (1960).
90. 3 CoRBIN § 536, at 26 (1962).
91. Id. 28.
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under other bargaining relationships. The widespread preference for
arbitration among parties to collective agreements stems in large mea-
sure from the fear that courts will be unwilling to look beyond the
words of the agreement to this nearly unbounded field of surrounding
circumstances, and that even if they are willing, they lack the com-
petence to do so. The extravagant language in the Steelworhers Gases
was a product of the Supreme Court's similar fears that judges would
be unwilling or unable to give appropriate consideration to surround-
ing circumstances. In this respect, the Court's creation of a presumption
in favor of arbitration expressed its belief that this basic principle of
contract interpretation could and would be more faithfully followed
by arbitrators than by the courts.
More narrowly, certain principles relating to the interpretation of
integrated contracts and the application of the parol evidence rule have
particular relevance for collective agreements. Arbitrators, like courts,
are constantly bombarded by one party or the other with arguments
that the parties' intent cannot be shown by extrinsic evidence unless
the words of the agreement are ambiguous, or that parol evidence
cannot be used to vary the plain meaning of the agreement. These
arguments are invoked to exclude consideration of past practices,
negotiating history, oral side agreements, or prior grievance settlements.
But as Professor Corbin has so forcefully demonstrated, the meaning
the parties intended to give the words cannot be known until one
knows the circumstances surrounding their use of those words. Only
then can it be determined whether the words are ambiguous or whether
they have one plain meaning rather than another. 2 The fact that an
arbitrator or court, in looking at the naked words, can see only one
meaning does not justify the imposition of that meaning on the
parties.9 3 In the words of Professor Corbin:
When it holds the parties bound in accordance with a meaning
which seems "plain and clear" to the court and excludes con-
vincing evidence that the parties gave the words a different mean-
ing ... the court is making a contract for the parties which they
did not make for themselves. 94
B. Completion, An Act of Creation
Beyond these principles for determining the meaning which the
parties intended is a basic counterprinciple of perhaps even greater
92. Id. § 542.
93. Id. § 539, at 80.
94. Id. § 542, at 111-12.
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importance to the law of collective agreements-that the parties may
be bound by a contract in ways they did not intend, foresee or under-
stand.95 As Professor Corbin reminds us at the very beginning of his
treatise:
The juristic effect (the resulting legal relations) of a man's expres-
sion in word or act may be very different from what he supposed
it would be. The legal effects that are produced by an "agreement"
depend upon past legislative and judicial history, of which men
must be largely ignorant. They may depend also upon surrounding
factors that are unknown to the parties and upon subsequently
occurring circumstances that could not be known to anybody.""
Parties to a contract may, either intentionally or by oversight, omit
certain terms or leave them to be determined in the future. When
litigation ensues, the court, if it is not to frustrate the parties' dominant
intent to make a contract, must often fill the gaps "if it is possible to
reach a fair and just result."917 Although courts declare that they will
not make a contract for the parties, they must frequently complete the
contract by filling in the omitted terms. Such completion is, in a very
real sense, an act of creation.
One of the marked characteristics of collective agreements is their
incompleteness, resulting in part from the failure of the parties to
foresee or provide for many future problems, and in part from their
inability to reach real agreement on certain issues which they do foresee.
The counterprinciple that the binding effect of a contract is not rigidly
circumscribed by what the parties had in mind when they signed it
legitimates the exercise by arbitrators and courts of a creative function
in completing the agreement.9 It invites inquiry beyond the often
futile or artificial search for nonexistent intent and encourages explicit
consideration of such factors as the purposes of the parties and the
institutional needs of collective bargaining, justice and fairness between
95. Sweet 9: Sweet, Architectural Cost Predictions: A Legal and Institutional Analysis.
56 CAIjF. L. REV. 996 (1968); Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omissions in Contracts, 68
CoLum. L. REv. 860 (1968); Note, Requirements Contracts: Problems of Drafting and
Construction, 78 HA{v. L. REv. 1212 (1965).
96. 1 Comm § 9, at 21 (1962).
97. Id. § 95, at 400.
98. The alternative to completing a contract is declaring that no contract has been
made. This may be a realistic alternative in other contractual relations, but it is an in-
tolerable alternative in collective bargaining relationships. It would reopen all of the
issues settled by prior bargaining and disrupt the entire relationship, almost guaranteeing
economic confict. The only realistic alternative is to preserve the existing agreement and
leave the parties to bargain out the unsettled terms, with ultimate resort to a strike or
lockout. But the presence of a no-strike clause commonly indicates that the parties them.
selves have rejected this alternative. Courts and arbitrators are then required to complete
the agreement if it is to remain a viable institution.
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the parties, the interests of third parties, and the public interest. It also
prevents preoccupation with the particular wording of the document
and focuses more attention on the legal effect to be given the agree-
ment. In weighing all of these considerations, the choice is made in
terms of the results to be reached; the agreement is then completed or
shaped to accomplish that result.
The problem of subcontracting may provide helpful illustrations.
Consider the case of an employer who had done no substantial sub-
contracting in the past. When the union from time to time expressed
fears for the future and suggested a no-subcontracting clause, the
proposal was rejected as "unrealistic" and "borrowing trouble." As a
result, discussions were inconclusive and the contract remained silent
on the matter. Then during the contract term the employer announced
that because of difficulties in keeping up on maintenance, it had sub-
contracted major repair, overhaul, and remodeling work. The union
protested that this subcontracting violated the recognition and seniority
clauses in the collective agreement and that the employer's unilateral
action violated the recognition clause as well. The employer claimed
reliance on the lack of a no-subcontracting clause and the words of the
management rights clause.
An arbitrator, searching for intent in such a case, might pursue the
shifting mirages thrown up by the contractual provisions or grope his
way through the fog of negotiation history. But if he confronts squarely
the necessity for completing the parties' agreement, given their failure
to provide for or against subcontracting, he will be far more likely to
seek, or more accurately to create, a result which will maximize the
competing interests on both sides. With his search thus directed, he
may find a solution which will protect the employees' job security,
enable the employer to get the maintenance work done, establish a
procedure which will increase the chance of discussion and agreement
on future instances of subcontracting, avoid giving either party a bar-
gaining advantage when it comes time to negotiate a contract and
bargain out the unsettled issue, and reinforce the statutory policy that
subcontracting is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The arbitrator
must, of course, be conscious of his primary obligation to work the will
of the parties and not replace their considered judgments with his. But
the contract principle discussed here reminds him that he who acts as
99. Wallen, How Issues of Subcontracting and Plant Removal Are Decided by Arbi.
trators, 19 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 265 (1966); Korety, How Issues of Subcontracting and
Plant Removal Are Handled by Courts, 19 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 239 (1966); Dash, The
Arbitration of Subcontracting Disputes, 16 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 208 (1962).
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judge must exercise judgment and he who completes must create.
Collective agreements by their incompleteness impose on him the
broad and heavy responsibility of performing a creative function.100
A similar subcontracting dispute was involved in United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company.10' The collective
agreement contained a broad arbitration clause requiring arbitration
of "differences.. . as to the meaning and application of the provisions
of this Agreement" and "any local trouble of any kind," but also pro-
vided that "matters which are strictly a function of management shall
not be subject to arbitration."'. 02 The agreement contained no provision
on subcontracting but did contain a management rights clause which
stated that "direction of the working forces, including the right to
hire, suspend or discharge for proper cause, or transfer, and the right
to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work or for other
legitimate reasons, is vested exclusively in the Company." The union
protested that the company, by subcontracting out work that "could
and has previously been performed by Company employees" while
employees were laid off violated the agreement. The company answered
that the subcontracting did not violate the agreement, because the
company had subcontracted in the past and the union had failed in
negotiations to obtain a clause limiting subcontracting. When the
dispute between the parties could not be resolved by the grievance
procedure, the union demanded arbitration of this "difference." The
company refused, arguing that subcontracting was "strictly a function
of management," and therefore not subject to arbitration.
The question before the Supreme Court was not whether the com-
pany had violated the agreement by subcontracting, but whether the
100. For an attempt to discern the principles to be applied by arbitrators in subcon-
tracting cases, see Gross, Value Judgments in the Decisions of Arbitrators. 21 IND. & L,,n.R._. Rnv. 55 (1967). For a caveat by a leading arbitrator on how little the arbitrator's
words may reveal of his abdominal cavity when he suffers from visceral jurisprudence, toeSeitz, Communications, 21 IND. &- LAB. Rut. REuv. 427 (1968).
101. 363 US. 574 (1960).102. All of these dauses were contained in the two introductory paragraphs of the
section on Adjustment of Grievances, and are stated below in their entirety.Issues which conflict with any federal statute in its application as established byCourt procedure or matters which are strictly a function of management shall not be
subject to arbitration under this section.Should differences arise between the Company and the Union or its members em-ployed by the Company as to the meaning and application oE provisions of thisAgreement, or should any local trouble of any kind arise, there shall be no suspen-
sion of work on account of such differences but an earnest effort shall be made to
settle such differences in the following manner.
There followed a five-step grievance procedure ending with:Fifth, if agreement has not been reached, the matter shall be referred to an impartial
umpire acceptable to both .... The decision of the umpire will be final.
553
The Yale Law Journal
dispute between the parties should be decided by arbitration. This is, of
course, a matter of contract, for arbitration must rest on the contract
of the parties. This truism, however, can lead us astray if it smuggles in
the premise that the contract is only what the parties had in mind when
they used the words, for this premise pushes aside the basic contract
principle that the courts must complete the contract and that this is
an act of creation. 103
The words of the arbitration clause quoted above may have a delu-
sive simplicity until we look to the alternative legal effects which may
be given to them. If the question whether the company violated the
agreement by subcontracting cannot be decided by arbitration, it must
be decided by the courts. To decide the dispute, the courts will have
to scrutinize the substantive terms of the agreement, the past practices
of the parties, and the bargaining history to determine what, if any,
limitations the agreement places on subcontracting. Similarly, other
disputes over whether the company by its actions has violated the
agreement or kept within the sphere of management rights allowed by
the agreement will not be decided by arbitration but by the courts.
The result will be two categories of disputes, one decided by arbitrators
and the other decided by judges, with no guide to distinguish the two
except the self-defining phrase "matters which are strictly a function of
management." To avoid this result, the arbitration clause might be
read as requiring a court to make a preliminary inquiry to determine
whether the company's action was clearly within its management func-
tion and to order arbitration only when the court found uncertainty-a
contractual Cutler-Hammer rule. However, neither of these results fits
comfortably within the broad wording of the arbitration clause, both
conflict with the parties' apparent preference for the arbitration pro-
cess, and both involve the courts in weighing the substantive merits of
disputes. There is a third choice, to read the limiting clause as simply
affirming that any matters which have been left wholly within manage-
ment's discretion by the agreement shall not be subjected to any
103. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals clearly decided the merits
directly. Then having found for the employer on the merits, they found that the union
had no right to arbitrate. In the District Court the conclusions of law, in sequence, were:
4. The labor contract does not prohibit, and is not susceptible of being interpreted
to require that defendant is prohibited from contracting out work.
5. The labor contract does not give the plaintiff or any of its members or any of the
employees of the defendant the right to have arbitrated the question of whether the
defendant may contract out work.
168 F. Supp. 702, 705 (S.D. Ala. 1958). The Court of Appeals, in affirming, followed the
same sequence of reasoning. 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959).
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qualifications through arbitration. The dispute whether the employer
had discretion under the agreement to subcontract would be decided
by the arbitrator who, if he found that the agreement gave the employer
discretion, would not review the employer's actions.
In choosing which meaning to give the arbitration clause, the courts
must weigh the legal effects and choose that meaning which most
nearly achieves the results sought by the parties. But in this case such
an approach only leads us to the gap in the agreement, for the parties
did not make clear how the function of interpreting and applying sub-
stantive terms of the agreement should be allocated between the arbi-
trator and the courts. Indeed, the parties probably did not even clearly
comprehend that the legal effect of excluding a category of disputes
from arbitration was to allocate the power to decide those disputes to
the courts.
Under such circumstances, contract principles require the court to
complete the contract by choosing that result which will be consistent
with the general framework of the parties' purposes and values as
revealed by their agreement and their bargaining relationship. But
contract principles also recognize that the court may properly give
weight to considerations such as the court's lack of confidence in its own
competence to decide such disputes, its interest in avoiding the burden
of such cases, and its finding of a legislative policy favoring the arbitra-
tion process.0 4 These considerations were explicitly weighed by the
Court in Warrior & Gulf and summarized in the shorthand expression
that there is a presumption in favor of arbitrability. The dissent found
this "an entirely new and strange doctrine," 05 but itself gave weight to
considerations beyond the parties' intent. The dissent casts the balance
in the opposite direction, relying on the traditional judicial hostility to
arbitration'0 6 expressed in the requirement that "the intention of the
104. Since the power to enforce carries with it the power to interpret, the legal con-
cept of contract has come to include "not merely the agreement itself, but the entire
body of law guiding its interpretation and enforcement so that official control be-
comes an integral part of the contract itself."
J.M. CLARK, SoCIAL. CONTROL OF Busmsss 100 (2d ed. 1939). F. Krssrn & AM. Siau, CASEs
AND MATERIALS ON CoNMUcrs 82 (1953).
105. 363 US. at 589.
106. See 363 U.S. at 586-87, and particulary the footnotes where language of previous
decisions is italicized. After quoting Mr. Justice Cardozo's words, "our own favor or dis-favor of the cause of arbitration is not to count as a factor in the appraisal of the
thoughts of others," Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 299. 169 N.E.386, 891 (1929), the footnotes twice quoted other courts rejecting such professed neu-
trality with statements that the terms of the arbitration agreement "must be clear and
unmistakable to oust the jurisdiction of the Court for trial by jury cannot be taken away
in any case merely by implication!' Continental Milng & Feed Co. v. Doughnut Co.,
186 Md. 669, 676, 48 A.2d 447, 450 (1946) (emphasis added by the Court).
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parties ... should be made manifest by plain language."1 ' But both
majority and dissent, despite their differences of result, were engaged
in the creative function required by the contract principle under dis-
cussion. Both agreed, with greater or lesser degrees of candor, that the
legal policy concerning arbitration should be given weight in choosing
the legal effect to be given the agreement. They disagreed only on
whether that legal policy favors or disfavors arbitration. 08
C. Revision, A Social Responsibility
The contract principle that illegal bargains are unenforceable has
particular significance for the law of collective agreements. The Labor
Management Relations Act contains a number of express prohibitions
against certain kinds of contract clauses. Section 8(e) prohibits "hot
cargo" clauses, Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) restrict union security
clauses, and Section 302 circumscribes welfare and pension plans.
Provisions which violate these statutory prohibitions are obviously
unenforceable between union and employer. And policies radiating
from the statute impose other limitations on the collective agreement.
An agreement made between an employer and a minority union is void
if it purports to cover all employees, because it restrains the employees'
rights of self-organization guaranteed by Section 7.109 Similarly, a provi-
sion in an agreement which is arbitrary as to any individual group of
employees is void because it violates the union's duty of fair representa-
tion, a duty which derives from the union's status as exclusive repre-
sentative. 110 In short, the statutory structure establishes a framework
within which the collective agreement is required to fit if it is to be
legal and enforceable.
These specific examples serve to remind us that in making collective
agreements, as in making other contracts, the parties are not completely
free to make any agreement they wish."' Free collective bargaining,
107. Quoted twice, 363 U.S. at 586 n.3, and 363 U.S. at 590, from US. v. Moorinan, 338
U.S. 457, 462 (1950).
108. In theory, the courts might use an approach which would be neutral to arbitra-
tion. But when the issue is one of arbitrability, the simple question before the court is
which tribunal, the court or the arbitrator, should adjudicate the dispute (assuming that
the no-strike clause bars trial by combat). It is difficult to understand how the court can
be wholly indifferent as to whether or not it is the tribunal to make the decision when
it has important institutional interests at stake.
109. ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
110. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Syres v. Oil Workers,
350 U.S. 892 (1955); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). Provisions of collective
agreements may also be illegal under the antitrust laws, United Mine Workers v. Penning-
ton, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
111. See Lenhoff, Optional Terms (Jus Dispositium) and Required Terms (Jus Cogens)
in the Law of Contracts, 45 MicH. L. Rzv. 39 (1946).
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like liberty of contract, is not an absolute; the parties' mutual desires
may be defeated, trimmed, or shaped by overriding policies." 2 These
specific examples also serve to emphasize that collective agreements,
because they are intimately affected by statutory provisions and policies,
are more subject than most contracts to external restraints and guid-
ance. Indeed, the presence of the statute and the public function of
collective bargaining place on the courts an exceptionally heavy re-
sponsibility to decide when and how to impose restraints on the parties'
agreements in order to give effect to the statutes' multiple policies,
including the statutory policy of freedom of contract. Difficult as this
task may be, the courts have no choice. To the famous statement,
"Public policy is an unruly horse and dangerous to ride," Professor
Corbin gave the unanswerable reply, "However unruly the horse may
be, it is not possible for the courts to refuse to ride."" 3 We may criti-
cize the courts for their horsemanship, but not for riding the horse on
which contract principles place them."
4
The responsibility of the courts for tailoring collective agreements
to relevant policies"3 may of course be achieved not only by excising
provisions as illegal, but also by shaping through interpretation.", The
112. For an illuminating and useful analysis of the various kinds of basic competing
policies which courts must weigh in contract cases, see Macaulay, Justice Traynor and
the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REv. 812 (1961).
113. 6A CORBiN § 1375, at 21 n.9 (1962). Professor Corbin emphasized his point by
going on to say: "Justice (whether described as "natural" or artificial), public policy.
general welfare, the settled convictions of mankind, community ideals, arc all modes of
describing substantially the same thing. It is this that the courts are established to ad-
minister and upon which in the last analysis their judgments are based." Id.
114. "The art of generalization on the basis of past experience, judicial or othmervise,
is always a difficult one; and old doctrine continually requires amendment and 'restate-
ment." It is doubly difficult when climates of opinion on political or economic welfare
are in flux. The judge then deserves our sympathy who must make a decision on the
basis of 'public policy'; and he must expect our criticism after he makes it." 6A Cour§ 1375, at 14 (1962).
115. The arbitrator does not have the same responsibility or competence as the courts
to give effect to statutory or other legal policies. The arbitrator is a creature of the con-
tract; he is selected by the parties because they trust him to interpret and apply the
contract; he owes his primary loyalty to the parties and to the improvement of their
relationship; and he is often not legally trained. For these reasons he should not be ex-
pected to subject the parties' agreement to external restraints and guidance by applying
legal and social policies other than those shared by the parties themselves. For a con-
trary view, see Blumrosen, Public Policy Considerations in Labor Arbitration, 14 RUtos
L. Rav. 217 (1960). The arbitrator does, of course, interpret and apply the agreement in
the context of all of the values shared by the parties, and one of his functions is to
accommodate and give expression to those values. This will inevitably require him to be
responsive to many social and legal values beyond the conscious consideration of the
parties. But he has little, if any, scope for overruling the parties' intent or common
purposes by applying values not shared by them.
116. The term "interpretation" is a minomer, for it does not rest on the mutual
intent or purpose of the parties. Professor Corbin termed it "construction" to make the
distinction explicit. But when the opinion is written, the rationalization is expressed in
terms of intent even though it is an intent constructed by the court; and the court
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device of interpretation may, indeed, be preferable, for it can provide
more flexibility in balancing other policies with freedom of contract.111
In Mastro Plastics,"8 the collective agreement contained a broad and
unqualified no-strike clause. When the union struck to protest the
employer's gross unfair labor practices, the Supreme Court found in
the bare words of the no-strike clause a conflict with the statutory
policies of full freedom of association and self-organization. Instead of
invalidating the clause, however, the court read the all-inclusive words
of the no-strike clause "in the light of the law under which the contract
was made," and found therein no prohibition against strikes to remedy
such clearly unfair labor practices. The Court in effect rewrote the no,
strike clause and still preserved freedom of contract by indicating that
the parties could agree to bar such strikes. It simply required that such
an agreement which encroached on statutory policies must be explicitly
stated in the no-strike clause.
Similar balancing of statutory policies and freedom of contract was
involved in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Company.n 0 The
union struck to compel the reinstatement of an employee who had been
discharged for unsatisfactory work. The collective agreement contained
an arbitration clause requiring that disputes over discharges be sub-
mitted to binding arbitration, but did not contain a no-strike clause
explicitly applicable to strikes over disputed discharges. 20 The court
makes explicit that if the parties do make explicit a contrary intent, that intent will
control.
117. For the use of both devices to curb the use and effect of provisions dlsclahnling
warranties in the sale of goods, see Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under
Modern Sales Law, 74 YAt L.J. 262 (1964); Von Hippel, The Control of Exemption
Clauses: A Comparative Study, 16 INT. 9- ComP. L.Q. 591 (1967).
118. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
119. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
120. This is the Court's characterization of the arbitration clause, but when the clause
is closely scrutinized there is reason to conclude that the Court created an unreal case to
pronounce a general principle. The arbitration and no-strike clauses were worded as
follows:
Should any difference as to the true interpretation of this agreement arise, same
shall be submitted to a Board of Arbitration of two members, one representing the
firm and one representing the Union. If said members cannot agree, a third mentber,
Who must be a disinterested party shall be selected and the decislon of said Board
of Arbitration shall be binding. It is further agreed by both parties hereto that
during such arbitration, there shall be no suspension of wOrk.
Should any difference arise between the employer and the employee, saffe shall be
submitted to arbitration by both parties. Failing to agree, they shall mutually appoint
a third person whose decision shall be final and binding.
The first paragraph describes disputes between the union and the employer and arbitra-
tion between them. The second paragraph describes disputes between an employee and
the employer and arbitration between them. The no-strike clause applies to all disputes
described in the first paragraph, that is, collective disputes. The no-strike clause is missing
froin the secohd paragraph dealing with individUal disputes, where by definition there
is no "difference" betwden the uhion and the employer. The dispute which triggered
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upheld the employer's suit for damages for breach of contract, inter-
preting the arbitration clause as containing a co-extensive no-strike
obligation.'"
[A] strike to settle a dispute which a collective bargaining agree-
ment provides shall be settled exclusively and finally by coin-
pulsory arbitration constitutes a violation of the agreement ..
[A] contrary view would be completely at odds with the basic
policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral process
as a substitute for economic warfare.'
The court left the parties free to agree that the union might strike over
disputes which were subject to arbitration, but required that if the
parties wished to assert that freedom they must do so in explicit terms
in the collective agreement a3 Obviously such a result affects the rela-
tive bargaining positions of the parties, for the burden is on the union
to obtain a provision reserving the right to strike rather than on the
company to obtain a provision prohibiting strikes. The dynamics of
bargaining give this burden practical significance, for the bargaining
advantage rests with the party who would leave the agreement un-
the strike was one between the union and the employer over whether the di-diarged
employee's work had been "satisfactory" within the meaning of the ditcdarge proi'ion
of the agreement. In short, the no-strike clause can be sensibly interpreted to prohibit
the strike involved here; indeed, it required some obtuseness for the Court to feel com-
pelled to read it otherwise.
121. It should be noted that under both paragraphs. arbitration was mandatory and
the award was to be "binding." If the parties intended this provision to be legally en-
forceable, then it would seem that they did not contemplate that either party could take
unilateral economic action to reverse an award. The award against the union can hardly
be said to be "binding" if the union is not obligated to accept it and can strike for the
opposite result. Such an award would be little more than advisory.
There is some question whether an arbitration clause which provides only for an ad-
visory award is legally enforceable. The courts might properly refuse to entertain cases
and issue orders compelling arbitration when either party might frustrate the process
and overturn the decision by unilateral economic action. Arbitration under such circum-
stances would be unlikely to have sufficient therapeutic value as to justify the court's
lending its efforts and prestige to the advisory process.
122. 569 U.S. at 105.
123. There was no evidence in the record before the Court to show why the parties
had worded the arbitration clause in the awkward way they did. The core of the di&-ent
is that because the no-strike pledge is so common and co important, it is hardly probable
that the parties would have overlooked it or left it to implication. This ignores the fact
that the parties did include a no-strike clause and at most left ambiguous whether it
applied to this dispute. Certainly, careful draftsmen would have made matters more
explicit, but the whole section betrays the parties' clumsiness with words. There is noth-
ing in the words or even any testimony in the record to suggest that the union intended
when it agreed to the no-strike clause to reserve the right to strike when disputes in-
volved interpretation and application of the discharge clause.
The inclusion of an arbitration clause without any express no.strike clause may be a
deliberate ambiguity devised to enable the parties to sign a contract when they are
unable to agree on this critical issue. For such a case, sce W.L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters
Local 25, 126 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1954), where the clause was drafted by the Masa-
chusetts Commissioner of Labor to settle a troublesome dispute.
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changed, silent, or ambiguous. The weight of statutory policy was, in
this measure, added to one of the parties' economic strength or bar-
gaining power to favor the inclusion of a no-strike obligation.
This is not the place to discuss whether there is in fact a statutory
policy of preserving the right to strike against unfair labor practices, as
the Court found in Mastro Plastics, or whether there is a statutory
policy of curtailing the right to strike over arbitrable grievances, as the
Court found in Lucas Flour. Nor is this the place to discuss what weight
the Court should give those statutory policies as against other policies,
including freedom of contract. The central point here is that the Court
in Mastro Plastics and Lucas Flour was doing that which was required
of it by the contract principle underlying the law of illegal bargains.
The dissent in Lucas Flour protested:
I had supposed ... that the job of courts enforcing contracts was
to give legal effect to what the contracting parties actually do, not
what the courts think they ought to do.124
But the courts' task is not that simple, for as Professor Corbin reminds
us, no matter how unruly the horse of public policy, the courts are re-
quired to ride.12 To deny that they must and do ride only prevents
them, and us, from critically examining their horsemanship. The need
for critical examination of performance is particularly pressing in the
case of collective agreements, because of the competing and sometimes
conflicting statutory policies which envelop them. The court cannot
hope to give proper effect and weight to those policies unless it clearly
recognizes its function and faces it squarely.
20
124. 369 U.S. at 108 (Black, J., dissenting).
125. Professor Kessler has stated the point more forcefully and more elegantly:
Thus in the evolution of the law of contracts, the basic assumption of the past that
contract deals with the individual relations of men to each other has gradually given
way to the realization that in large sectors of our social and economic life contract
is no longer an individual and private affair, but a social institution affecting more
than the interests of the two contracting parties. An analysis, therefore, of present-
day contract exclusively in terms of volition and agreement does not do justice to
contract as a social institution. Social control has become an integral part of contract
itself, and cannot be omitted from any analysis of the modern law of contract.
F. KEssLER & M. SKA"R, CoNTRAcr CASES & MATERIALS 9 (1953).
126. Courts are not ideal institutions for performing this function, and schoolboy
learning teaches that policy choices are for the legislature. Certainly this counsels the
courts to tread softly in the area, but for them to refuse to perform this function al.
together would be to reject an historically established responsibility. Indeed the history
of Section 301 of Taft-Hartley suggests that the courts may do a more responsible and
workable job of developing the law of collective agreements than Congress. That section,
as written by Congress, left every significant question unanswered-what substantive law
was to be applied, what remedies were to be available, whether state courts should be
given jurisdiction, what role should be given to arbitration, and what role should be
given the NLRB. The Court's performance in giving this vacuous section sense and con-
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To the extent that the court, by requiring explicit terms, favors one
result rather than another, it changes the relative bargaining power of
the parties. In the sense that it has interfered with the free play of
market forces, the court has interfered with freedom of contract. The
market in question, however, has already been closely structured by
the statute, and the use of economic force has been tightly regulated by
the law. The interference added by policy-oriented judicial interpreta-
tion is but gossamer in comparison with restraints imposed by the
statutory duty to bargain and by limitations on secondary pressures.
Furthermore, interpretation does not substitute the judgment of the
court for the judgment of the parties if they have agreed on what is in
their mutual self-interest. They need only make the result they seek
adequately explicit. In the sense that they are free, within certain outer
limits, to reach any agreement they mutually desire, freedom of contract
remains unimpaired. Statutory policies become determinative only
when the parties have failed to arrive at any clear resolution of their
conflicting interests and desires.
Summary
The usefulness of contract law to collective agreements thus seems
to be directly proportional to the generality of the legal propositions
involved. As we have seen, detailed rules and even general doctrines
are of little use, as often misleading as enlightening. The most useful
legal propositions are the broad, nearly formless general principles
which guide the interpretation of contracts, the function of the court in
completing contracts, and the responsibility of the court to fit the agree-
ment of the parties within the framework of overriding public policies.
These principles quite obviously do not pretend to provide copybook
answers to specific cases, but they do provide valuable guides to the
facts to be examined and the considerations to be weighed in arriving
at effective solutions.
These general contract principles have not been ignored in the law of
collective agreements, although they are seldom identified as rooted
in the law of contracts in arbitration and court opinions. Arbitrators
customarily follow Professor Corbin's principles of interpretation with-
out ever having read his treatise. They are seldom impaled on doctrines
of integrated contracts or the parol evidence rule; they simply admit
all evidence "for what it may be worth," and use it all to try to deter-
tent may be faulted, but it hardly demonstrates that the courts are les competent than
Congress to perform this function, or that the courts should stay their hand until Con.
gress has given guidance.
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mine what the parties intended. Professor Corbin would applaud their
approach even while they studiously ignore contract law. Both courts
and arbitrators recognize that they must fill the gaps in collective agree-
ments and settle terms left unsettled. Even the Supreme Court has
applied these principles with fair consistency and occasional boldness,
while at the same time denigrating or disowning "ordinary contract
law."
The law of collective agreements, therefore, does not need to borrow
principles from the law of contracts; it needs only to acknowledge the
debt it already owes. Such an acknowledgment would strengthen the
law of collective agreements. Both courts and arbitrators would move
with more confidence if they could feel that they were building on
tested foundations; and they would move with better understanding
and deeper insight if they could draw on the accumulated experience
of courts in developing and applying underlying contract principles.
IV. The Usefulness of the Law of Collective Agreements for the Law
of Contracts
One who views contract law from the perspective of labor law, and
whose last working contact with contract law was twenty years ago,
should perhaps be cautious in venturing broad pronouncements on the
subject. The risk is great that what may be said here will fall between
the two stools of the obvious and the foolish. But collective agreements
are contracts, though long treated as disowned offspring; and the law
of collective agreements should have something to add to our under,
standing of the law of contracts.
At the most elementary level, the law of contracts could be enriched
simply by drawing examples from the law of collective agreements to
illustrate basic principles. A labor lawyer reading Corbin on Contracts
cannot help regretting that Professor Corbin seemed unaware of how
vividly his vigorously articulated principles were being demonstrated
daily by arbitrators and courts in developing the law of collective agree-
ments. Professor Corbin emphasized that all of our legal rules are only
"tentative working rules" to be tested by experience and evolved as we
more clearly perceive the problems to which we apply them.' "2 Could
the law of contracts provide any better example than the continuing
effort of the courts to work out their proper role in labor arbitration?
127. 1 CORBIN iv, v (1950); 1 id. § 3; 3 id. § 535; 6A id. § 1375. See Kesslcr, Review,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, 61 YALE LJ. 1092 (1952).
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The Cutler-Hammer doctrine was tried, and when experience demon-
strated its stultifying effect on the constructive role of labor arbitra-
tion, 2 8 the Supreme Court, in the Steelworkers Cases, decisively repu-
diated Cutler-Hammer and set the law in a new direction. The evidence
now available suggests that while the new rules have generally strength-
ened labor arbitration,1'29 those rules in turn need modifications. 3 0
Wiley v. Livingston'3' represented the first statement of tentative work-
ing rules to enable collective agreements to survive corporate mergers
and consolidations-rules which are now in the process of being tested
and reshaped. 32 Lucas Flour represents a tentative rule on implied
no-strike clauses, the value and workability of which can be tested only
by experience. Humphrey v. Moore'33 and Vaca v. Sipes"3 I are only tAo
in a long series of attempts to develop working rules as to the rights of
individual employees under collective agreements. Every labor lawyer
who has a memory beyond last year's term of court can verify by
multiple examples the truth and compelling relevance of Professor
Corbin's central tenet.
When we go beyond the illustrative function of the law of collective
agreements and attempt to integrate that body of law into the tradi-
tional structure of contract rules and principles, however, the elaborate
edifice begins to crumble. There is no logical reason why we should
not attempt such integration, for collective agreements are undeniably
contracts, and the law of contracts, if it exists, should be able to absorb
the law of collective agreements into its generalizations. When we
actually attempt this integration, however, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the law of contracts, as commonly set forth in the
Restatement and the treatises, is either fundamentally inadequate or
an illusion.
128. See Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Look-ing Glass, 2 BuFF. L. REv. 1 (1952); Cox, Current Problems in the Law of GrievanceArbitration, 30 RocKy MT. L. REv. 247 (1958); Wellington, Judge Magruder and the
Labor Contract, 72 HA.v. L. REv. 1268 (1959).
129. Jones 9 Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticism of the Arbitra-
tion Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 1115 (1964). Smith & Jones, The
Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 Mari. LREV. 751 (1965); Smith & Jones, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance
Arbitration, on Judges, Arbitrators and Parties, 52 VA. L. RE,. 831 (1966).130. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. Cn.
L. REv. 545 (1967); H. WVELLINGrON, LABOR AND THE LEG.AL PROCrSS 106-09 (1968).
131. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
132. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Draftsmen's Ass'n, 393 F.2d 407 (lstCir. 1968); Shaw & Carter, Sales, Mergers and Union Contract Relations, in NYU NINE.
TENTm ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 357 (1967); Note, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 967 (1967).
133. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
134. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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Consider, just for a beginning, the difficulties of integrating into the
law of third party beneficiary contracts the rights of individual em-
ployees under a collective agreement. Either most of the rules now
stated with confident generality in treatises or in the Restatement
would be fractured with qualifications and exceptions,'
5 or, more
likely, the generalizations would continue to be stated with abstract
purity and new sections would be added stating special rules for collec-
tive agreements. The only integration would be by the printer who
bound the disparate sections within the same hard covers. Consider, in
addition, restating the rules of damages to reflect the forms and uses of
remedies now granted through arbitration for breach of collective
agreements, adjusting the traditional rules of offer and acceptance to
resolve problems that arise out of union procedures for membership
ratification of agreements; or rewriting the rules governing the liability
of successors and assigns so as to describe the legal consequences when
one union replaces another as bargaining representative and when the
consolidation of production units scrambles bargaining units. A new
Restatement would obviously need to be undertaken and would,
equally obviously, never be finished. The briefest consideration of the
problems of attempting to integrate the law of collective agreements
into the law of contracts makes us realize how inadequate our presently
stated rules of contract law are for the task and how impossible it would
be to restate them in a way to make them adequate. This, in turn,
should make us wonder whether there may not be something basically
defective in our present statement or even our conception of the law
of contracts.
Our problems with the law of contracts multiply when we remember
that the reasons traditionally given for treating collective agreements
as something outside "ordinary contract law" are equally applicable to
many other contractual transactions. Is the law of contracts as ill-
equipped to deal with these other transactions as it is with collective
agreements, although perhaps in different ways? What about long term
requirements contracts, dealerships and franchises, restrictive covenants
in deeds and long term leases of business properties, condominiums and
cooperative housing arrangements, or even the common transaction of
student registration in a university-how well do these fit within the
presently stated contract rules? Put in more mundane but more prac-
135. See, e.g., the Court's struggle to restate the law of third party beneficiary con.
tracts in Lewis v. Benedict Coal Co., 361 U.S. 459 (1960). The employer attempted to set
off his damages resulting from the union's strikes in breach of the collective agreement
against his liability to the pension and welfare fund.
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tical terms, would a lawyer or a judge find answers to problems arising
out of these transactions in Corbin, Williston, or the Restatement? And
if he found answers, would they be answers which would lead to satis-
factory results? 36
My uneasy suspicion is that lawyers dealing with problems arising
out of such transactions find the law of contracts as inadequate as do
the labor lawyers dealing with problems arising out of collective agree-
ments. Certainly this seems to be the case with certain kinds of con-
tractual transactions such as insurance, stock certificates, trust inden-
tures, oil and gas leases, and ship charters. The difficulty of integrating
the legal rules applicable to these transactions into the law of contracts
is in practice neatly avoided by allocating them to separately named
fields of law deriving their names from law school curricular labels or
West Digest headings. Professor Corbin justified his pushing aside of
collective agreements with the revealing assertion that "[t]hey cannot
be treated with advantage separately from the general subject of Labor
Relations and Labor Legislation."' 37 In the same way, it is commonly
accepted that these other contractual arrangements "cannot be treated
with advantage" separately from the general subject of the activity of
which they are a part.
But if these kinds of contracts cannot be treated with advantage
apart from the activity out of which they arise, may this not be true of
all contracts? What is this "law of contracts" about which treatises and
restatements are written? It almost seems to be the law of left-overs, of
miscellaneous transactions, the rag-tag and bob-tail which do not get
treated elsewhere.138 This is, of course, a caricature, but perhaps an
instructive one.
A casual thumbing of the treatises and a glance at the factual situa-
tions described in the Restatement do little to dispel the impression
that this caricature has much truth in it. The law of contracts, as there
presented, is made up of rules which are worded as if they were ap-
plicable quite apart from any concrete circumstances. The rules are
evolved from cases which tend to be stated without any particular
reference to the background of the transactions involved, and thus give
the impression of raising contract issues in their purest and simplest
136. For a colorful statement of the "ineffectuality of orthodox contract law" for sig-
nificant commercial transactions, see Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New
Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 V.L. L. RE%,. 213,
254-56 (1966).
137. 6A CoRBiN § 1420, at 345 (1962).
138. S. MACAuL.AY, LAW AND THE BALAN CE OF PowER: Tnm Autromouux MAnU-
FAcruRERs AND TH-m DEAlES 198 (1966).
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forms. 39 The epitome of abstraction is the Restatement, which illus-
trates its black letter rules by transactions suspended in mid-air, cre-
ating the illusion that contract rules can be stated without reference
to surrounding circumstances and are therefore generally applicable to
all contractual transactions. In many of the illustrations the surround-
ing circumstances are not stated because they are so commonplace.
Contracts to buy a car, to sell a house, to haul gravel, to employ a
clerk, to grant a reward, to support a parent, or to make a will-in all
of these we unconsciously supply stereotyped surroundings. In so doing,
we are likely to forget how frequently those surroundings influence the
result. Other illustrations seem to be of simple transactions-selling
flour, shipping goods, publishing an advertisement, leasing a building, or
guaranteeing payment of a debt-but they seem simple only because
we do not know the surrounding circumstances and assume that there
are no relevant business practices or complicating considerations. In all
cases there is the silent assumption that if the circumstances are other
than those assumed, the result may be different. Economic theories
built upon the assumption of "other things being equal" may be useful,
but detailed contract rules built upon the disclaimer "in the absence
of special circumstances" are of limited utility in solving problems or
building an integrated body of law capable of dealing effectively with
the infinite variety of contractual transactions.
The law of contracts as presently conceived, therefore, cannot be
expected to provide a framework for integrating the rules and prin-
ciples applicable to all contractual transactions. Its generalizations are
built largely upon selected cases considered to be "contract" cases by
139. "'Pure' contract doctrine is blind to details of subject matter and person. It
does not ask who buys and who sells, and what is bought and sold. . . Contract law Is
abstraction-what is left in the law relating to agreements when particularities of person
and subject-matter are removed." L. FRIEDMAN, CONrTAar LAW IN AMmaioA 20 (1965).
Professor Friedman's analysis, if I understand it correctly, is that contract law originally
consisted of legal rules reflecting the abstraction of the free market. As economic activities
became regulated and transactions became subject to regulatory legal rules, contract law
was displaced. "Pure" contracts are those which remain unregulated. In short, the legal
rules of regulated transactions are not contract law.
This, it seems to me, looks through the telescope from the wrong end, for it narrows
rather than broadens our vision. Contract law has always, in some measure, and In
greater measure than most courts or scholars would openly acknowledge, regulated the
content of the parties' agreement and injected social values into free market bargains.
Both legislatures and courts have increasingly socialized contractual relations. One of the
central goals of contract law should be to articulate what those social values are and how
they become a part of the contractual relation. This requires our seeing the funda-
mentally common elements of contractual transactions, a vision which is not aided by
casting out of contract law all of those transactions in which the regulatory aspect
becomes visible. Professor Friedman would make tontract law nearly synonymous with
freedom of contract; I would make freedom of contract a significant but not absolute
value in all contractual transactions.
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legal scholars, restatement writers, annotators, and indexers. This tends
to exclude cases involving "special" transactions which can be treated
more easily under other headings. The legal rules thus developed are
not rules of general applicability; they are at most general rules ade-
quate for regulating those transactions which are either not complicated
enough or numerous enough to have stimulated the development of
separate bodies of rules. From the perspective of collective agreements
and other special contracts, the law of contracts presented in treatises
and the Restatement is not a parent body of law but rather just another
portion of the multifaceted law of contractual transactions. 40
Having served the destructive purpose of discrediting the illusory
unity of the law of contracts, the law of collective agreements ought at
least to serve the constructive purpose of leading us to search for a
more fundamental unity. Like the law of insurance contracts, the law
of leases, the law of partnership agreements, and many other special
contractual transactions, the law of collective agreements is a part of
that amorphous field of law which might best be labeled the law of
contractual transactions. Each of these categories has its own identity,
for each has its own body of rules shaped by the special economic, social,
institutional, and legal conditions surrounding the type of transaction
with which it is concerned. If the "law of contracts" is to be conceived
as encompassing all contractual transactions, it must not be concep-
tualized as a single body of law but as a family of bodies of law, inter-
related but each distinctive. The study of contract law then becomes a
study of comparative law.
Viewing contract law as an area for comparative study rather than as
a unified body of law serves an immediate corrective purpose. It reduces
the temptation to assume that a rule developed for one type of transac-
tion is equally suitable for other types of transactions. It focuses our
attention on the distinctive characteristics and surrounding circum-
stances of each type of transaction, and then encourages us to ask how
particular rules respond to that distinctiveness. It encourages us, before
borrowing rules or precedents from one setting, at least to inquire
whether they will work the same results in the new setting. And in the
140. Professor Friedman seems to equate general contract law with transactions which
retain nearly total freedom of contract, and splits off as specialized boties ot law those
rules governing transactions which have been so regulated as to circumscribe freedom of
contract. See note 189 supra. We might wish that legal categories had such philosophic
rationality; but contract categories often have little more basis than the pragmatic reason
that there are sufficient cases and statutes to make up a duster of rules which some
scholar, judge, or indexer can organize systematically, Even without legislative interven-
tion insurance contracts, leases, sales warranties, and collective agreements would have
developed their special bodies of law.
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process it directs our efforts more toward understanding the problem to
be solved and weighing the results to be achieved than to searching for
a particular rule to be applied.
Recasting the law of contracts as the comparative law of contractual
transactions serves the larger intellectual purpose of suggesting where
and how we are to search for unifying principles. We no longer expect
to find common rules and principles except at the most basic level,
framed in the most general terms. It would seem a reasonable guess, in
fact, that the principles common to the whole range of contractual
transactions are relatively few and of such generality and competing
character that they should not be stated as legal rules at all. Indeed, they
may be nothing more than a set of common problems radiating from
centers of tension such as that between subjective and objective tests
of agreement, between arms-length and fiduciary relations of the
parties, and between freedom of contract and social control.
The most likely place to begin the search for unifying principles
would seem to be those areas where we have already found contract
principles useful in the law of collective agreements and where the law
of collective agreements has seemed to follow those principles intui-
tively, or at least without articulate recognition. The pattern of deci-
sions suggests the presence of working principles which are so deeply
rooted that, even though unstated, they give direction to the develop-
ment of legal rules. Beyond helping us identify established unifying
principles, the law of collective agreements may suggest certain inchoate
or emerging principles of general validity throughout the various
bodies of contract law. In many respects the collective agreement is a
paradigm of a planning transaction, consciously encouraged by law as
an instrument both of private regulation and of social control. How-
ever, the law of collective agreements is at present so unformed and
immature that few explicit underlying principles have emerged. Fur-
thermore, the repeated disclaimers that collective agreements are
contracts have discouraged articulation of principles in terms which
would make them visibly relevant to other contractual transactions.
Hence the suggestion that the law of collective agreements might con-
tribute generally relevant principles to the law of other contractual
transactions now serves only to tease the imagination.
Nevertheless, with the aid of a bit of that same imagination, we can
perhaps see in the law of collective agreements the contours of certain
basic contract principles, though often cloaked in special rules of labor
law. A number of these cluster around the statutory duty to bargain in
good faith. To be sure, that statutory duty serves quite special needs. It
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reinforces the right to organize by requiring the employer to recognize
the majority union as the bargaining agent of his employees, and it
encourages industrial peace by requiring the parties to engage in a
process of reasoned discussions.' 41 These needs probably have few
obvious counterparts in other contractual transactions. However, the
duty to bargain does prescribe a standard of conduct for the parties in
the making and carrying out of their agreement. The good faith re-
quired here by the statute may be akin to the good faith and fair
dealing required in other contract situations by the courts. 142 There
are at least some intriguing resemblances. 4 3
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 14 the employer and
the union representing its employees in the maintenance department
had a twenty-year bargaining relationship of successive collective agree-
ments. The latest agreement was for one year, with automatic renewal
unless one of the parties gave 60-day notice of a desire to modify or
terminate. The union gave timely notice of a desire to modify and
submitted its proposed modifications. The employer made no statement
of its intentions and refused to meet with the union until four days
before the end of the contract term. At that time the employer in-
formed the union that it had decided to contract out its maintenance
work, because this would be more economical than under the existing
collective agreement and because the union in past years had resisted
changes designed to reduce costs. The employer refused to bargain
concerning its decision to subcontract and declared that because the
subcontracting would result in dismissal of all employees represented
by the union, any negotiations for a new agreement would be pointless.
The Supreme Court upheld the Board's decision that the employer had
violated its duty to bargain in good faith, and enforced the Board's
order directing the employer to resume its maintenance operations and
141. See Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Agreement, 112 U. P.
L. REv. 467, 469-77 (1964).
142. Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom
of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REv. 401 (1964).
143. Compare the definition of "good faith" in the Dealers' Day In Court Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1221(e) (19&4),
The term "good faith" shall mean the duty of each party to any franchise .. . to
act in a fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one
party freedom from coercion, intimidation or threats of coercion or intimidation
from the other party, Provided: That recommendation, endorsement, exposition,
persuasion, urging or argument shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good
faith
with the definition in Section 2-103(1)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code:
. ..honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade.
144. 379 US. 203 (1964).
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reinstate the affected employees with back pay until it had made good
faith efforts to reach an agreement with the union. The opinion is, of
course, cast in the language of labor law, and the decision is supported
by special statutory policies. But might not a contracts lawyer perceive,
implicit in the opinion of the Court, familiar basic principles and some
new thrusts of those principles? As an instrument of a continuing rela-
tionship the collective agreement necessarily contemplates continuity,
with periodic renegotiations to meet changing situations. From the
perspective of the contract principle of good faith and fair dealing,
should one party to such a contractual relationship be permitted sud-
denly to declare it at an end as no longer economically viable, without
giving the other party time to explore and accept changes which will
make it viable? If we examined certain other continuing contractual
relations, might we not find at least implicit this principle against
abrupt and arbitrary terminations? 14
The principle of good faith took a different form in NLRB v. Truitt
Manufacturing Company. 40 Again the union and the employer had an
established bargaining relationship. When the union sought a wage
increase of 10 cents per hour, the employer insisted that such an in-
crease would put it out of business. The union asked for financial
information to substantiate the claim so it could determine whether or
not to press the demand for a wage increase. When the employer
refused on the grounds that such information was not relevant to the
bargaining, the union was placed in the position of either accepting the
employer's assertion or calling a strike which would impose hardships
on the employees and which would, if the employer were correct, prove
futile and potentially self-destructive. The Supreme Court held that the
employer, by asserting his inability to pay and then refusing to provide
information to substantiate the assertion, had failed to bargain in good
faith. Again, the Court's decision is set within a statutory framework;
but the law of contracts recognizes several levels of the duty of one party
to a contract to give relevant information to the other.1 47 Although
many such cases smell of fraud, involving active or passive misleading,
others involve only overreaching, particularly where there exists an
145. See, e.g., Dealers' Day in Court Act, 70 Stat. 1126 (1956), 15 U.S.CA. § 1222 (1961),
allowing automobile dealers to recover damages from manufacturers who fall to act In
good faith in performing or complying with the terms of the franchise or in terminating,
cancelling, or not renewing it. State statutes have also limited the right to terminate or
to refuse to renew. See Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by
Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1183 (1957); S. MACAULAY, supra note 138, at 92-164.
146. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
147. See generally Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law,
74 YALE L.J. 262 (1964).
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established relationship which the courts may characterize as fiduciary.
The contract principle of good faith and fair dealing has shown some
impatience with parties who would turn contract-making into a game
of blindman's buff..14 In Truitt, where the employer put the union to
an oppressively hard choice by withholding crucial information, the
response of the Court should have a familiar ring in a contract lawyer's
ears:
Good faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by
either bargainer should be honest claims. This is true about an
asserted inability to pay an increase in wages. If such an argument
is important enough to present in the give and take of bargaining,
it is important enough to require some proof of its accuracy1
49
There may well be other contractual relations in which the principle of
fair dealing has been or should be extended to impose a duty to share
information which will facilitate the reaching of an agreement, limiting
the use of access to information as a bargaining lever.
The duty to bargain may also contain an element of protection
against overreaching. In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-.Warner
Corporation,50 the employer refused to enter into an agreement unless
it included a provision that the union would not strike on non-arbi-
trable issues except after a secret ballot vote by all employees, union
and non-union. The effect would have been to remove the decision-
making power from the union in derogation of its statutory rights as
exclusive representative. The union, of course, found this wholly un-
acceptable; but after two months of bargaining and a sLx-week strike,
it surrendered and signed such an agreement under protest. The
Supreme Court held that, although the clause was lawful, for the em-
ployer to insist upon it as a condition of making an agreement was a
violation of the statutory duty to bargain in good faith. The employer
could propose such a clause and try to persuade the union to agree, but
could not use its economic bargaining power to compel the union to
accept it151 Although the Court rationalized its decision in terms of
148. Proposals for consumer protection legislation are largely directed toward requir-
ing disclosure even though there is no fraud in the traditional sense. For example.
lenders may be required to disclose the full interest charges in terms of annual rate so
as to be readily understandable to the borrower. See Jordan & Warren, The Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, 68 CoLUm. L. Rnv. -87 (1968). It is also proposed that sellers label
goods and price them in a way which will permit buyers to make shopping comparisons.
See Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE UJ. 745, 773 (1967); see also
Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 -ARV. L. REv. 318 (1963).
149. 851 U.S. at 152-53.
150. 856 U.S. 842 (1958).
151. A central purpose of the labor relations statutes was to "equalize bargaining
power" by creating collective economic strength on the employees' side to match the
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"mandatory subjects of bargaining," a contracts lawyer might be ex-
cused for feeling that this was an inadequate description of the under-
lying principle against overreaching or unconscionable contracts. 15 2
This is not the simplistic argument that the duty to bargain is only a
transposition to labor law of contract principles, or that the duty to
bargain can be extrapolated to other contractual transactions. That
would be inadequate labor law and irresponsible contract law. The
duty to bargain is designed to meet the special needs of a special con-
tractual process, in which there is special social concern to avoid the
disruption caused by non-agreement. The legal rules governing other
types of transactions must be tailored to fit the special characteristics of
those transactions and the social concerns involved. That is the central
significance of viewing the law of contracts not as a unity but as a field
of comparative law. This, however, does not foreclose the possibility
that there may be certain broad unifying principles running through
the various bodies of contract law and that the law of collective agree-
ments may help illuminate them. All that is suggested here is that some
of these principles may be reflected in the statutory duty to bargain,
with full realization that a closer look might show the reflections to be
deceptive shadows of quite different principles.
Labor arbitration decisions display the impact of broad contract
principles much more plainly than do judicial decisions in labor cases.
For example, in deciding subcontracting cases, arbitrators may find
implied limitations in the recognition clause, the seniority clause, or
negotiation history. But running through many of the cases is the
principle that the union, having won benefits through hard bargaining,
should not have those benefits depreciated by the employer's moving
collective economic strength on the employers' side. The statutes, however, cannot Insure
that the countervailing powers will always balance. At times, one can and does over-
whelm the other. Many of the duty-to-bargain cases dramatically illustrate the real
danger of the stronger party overreaching and imposing unconscionable procedures or
provisions on the other. Some collective agreements might well be described as contracts
of adhesion. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLum. L. REv. 629 (1943). The most noted example is the standard form
contract used by the Musicians, but standardized agreements are commonly used by the
Teamsters and other unions who deal with large numbers of small employers who do
not belong to employers' associations.
152. See I CORBIN § 128 (1963). This principle has received statutory expression in
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which has in turn seeded a thunderstorm
of contentious articles. See, e.g., Braucher, Sale of Goods in the Uniform Commercial
Code, 26 LA. L. REv. 192 (1966); Left, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Note, Bargaining Power and Unconsciona.
bility: A Suggested Approach to U.C.C., Sec. 2-302, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 998 (1966); Note.
Commercial Decency and the Code-The Doctrine of Unconscionability Vindicated, 9
Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1968).
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work out of the area covered by the agreement. ,3 The extensive reli-
ance by arbitrators on past practice "5 4 also reflects the importance of
this principle that one party to a contract shall not by his conduct
deprive the other of the value of his bargain.'a Such principles may
be used more freely and explicitly by arbitrators than by judges because
of the arbitrator's sense of freedom from confining contract rules, and
also because of the necessity of explaining his result in elementary terms
of fairness. The evolving law of collective agreements may, therefore,
not only serve to illuminate these principles but also provide the cut-
ting edge for their further development and expansion.
The innovative character of labor arbitration is naturally conducive
to the development of principles which may reach beyond the law of
collective agreements. For example, labor arbitrators seem to have
evolved a broad principle of procedural regularity, particularly in the
parties' dealings with one another during the term of the relationship.
If the agreement provides that the employer may change shift sched-
ules, transfer employees, or create new job descriptions after discussion
with the union, changes effected without prior discussion are commonly
declared void even though there has been no substantial injury. An
employee who is given an improper order must obey and process his
protest through the specified grievance procedure, even though this
gives him no effective redress. Failure to notify the union prior to a
discharge, where that is required by the agreement, will lead to rein-
statement of an employee, regardless of his guilt. Such results do not
exalt procedure over substance but rather assert that procedure is an
essential part of the substance of a continuing contractual relationship
such as collective bargaining.
Arbitrators have also imported into collective agreements certain
procedural safeguards in the name of fundamental fairness.'"
0 Em-
ployees cannot be disciplined for conduct which they were not dearly
153. See Wallen, How Issues of Subcontracting and Plant Removal are Handled 
by
Arbitrators, 19 IND. & LAB. REL. Rv. 265 (1966); Dash, The Arbitration of Subcontracting
Disputes, 16 IND. & LAB. Rn.. 1ry. 208 (1962); Greenbaum. The Arbitration of Subcon-
tracting Disputes: An Addendum, 16 IND. & LAB. Rn.L. R EV. 291 (1962).
154. MAittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Agreements. in
AnrrRAION AND PUBLIC PoICY, PROCEEDiNGs, FOURTEE.-'TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADE Y oF ARmrrRA&oN 30 (1961); B. AARON, The Uses of the Past in Arbitration. in
ARBrrRAIoN TODAY 11 (1955).
155. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under tie
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm L. REv. 666 (1963); Mooney, supra note 136. at
244-53.
156. Cf. Professor Macaulay's thesis that in the automobile dealer franclL e situation
the concepts of due process have been used to give content to imprecise statutes and 
to
provide protection to the dealers. S. ? cAt.AwY, supra note 138, at 189-97.
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aware was punishable, or for violation of rules not regularly enforced.
Employees must be clearly informed of the reasons for discipline, they
must be allowed to consult a union steward immediately, they must
be confronted with the evidence against them, and their guilt must
be clearly proven.157 Rules against improperly obtained evidence, self-
incrimination, and double jeopardy are often enforced., 8 All of this is
done to protect the continuing employment relationship from abrupt
termination.159
These and other principles which one sees, or imagines he sees, at
work in labor arbitration, or in cases delineating the statutory duty to
bargain, will not provide precedents for deciding cases involving other
contractual transactions. But if we can identify contract principles
underlying collective agreements, it may help us recognize those prin-
ciples operating in other contracts. More important, it may give us
clearer insight into the nature and limitations of the principles them-
selves, and into the scope and effects of their application to various
types of contracts. This will in turn carry us a step further toward
restating the law of contracts as a collection of general principles, often
overlapping or competing, which unify the field of consensual arrange-
ments.
V. Conclusion
We have travelled far from Professor Corbin's dismissal of the collec-
tive agreement as not an "ordinary bargain of commerce" and relega-
tion of its treatment to "the general subject of Labor Relations and
Labor Legislation." We end with the conclusion that his attitude re-
flected not only a failure to recognize the nature of collective agree-
ments but also a failure to recognize the nature of the law of contracts.
He deprived the law of collective agreements of the benefits which his
forcefully articulated principles would have provided, and deprived
himself of the insights which the law of collective agreements might
have contributed.
If these conclusions are well-founded, Corbin on Contracts seems
almost to be a massive misdirection of effort. The major bulk of it is
157. See generally M. STONE, LABOR MANAGEMENT CONTRAMs AT WORK Ch. 10 (1961).158. R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBrrRAnTION PaocEss ch. 7 (1965).
159. Neither courts nor legislatures have provided even the shadow of such protection
of the employment relationship in the absence of a collective agreement, although the
need is obvious and the legal doctrines available. For an excellent analysis sce Blades,Employment at Will vs. Industrial Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Em-
ployer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967).
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composed of detailed rules applicable to only a limited range of transac-
tions: it sets forth not the law of contracts but only the rules of law for
some contracts. Professor Corbin, however, perhaps more than anyone
else, recognized the impossibility of stating firm rules applicable to all
situations. He stated at the very outset:
In the huge societies of today, transactions are continually escaping
from old forms and patterns; and opinions of social policy and
general welfare are affected by the conflicts among larger groups
struggling for a greater share in the objects of desire. New classifica-
tions are continually required; and old classifications continually
limited or replaced.160
He devoted years of labor to analyzing decisions, distilling detailed rules
and setting them down in a systematic structure, but at the same time he
repeatedly disclaimed any intent or hope to state crystallized rules. He
insisted that his rules were tentative working rules, not "dogmatic di-
rections to be followed," and he labored nearly as hard to demonstrate
the uncertainty of the rules as he did to state them. His great work was,
at one and the same time, a treatise and an anti-treatise, with a seeming
inner contradiction as to the reason for its creation. Perhaps if Professor
Corbin had seen collective agreements from the perspective presented
here, and had accepted the implications of that perspective, he would
have emphasized the anti-treatise and left the more pedantic work of
treatise writing to those less creative than himself.
160. 1 Conmi § 3, at 7-8 (1963).
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